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I. INTRODUCTION 
The story I intend to tell is not usually told in American law schools.  It is not 
about the Supreme Court (at least much).  Nor is it about the extraordinary 
challenges faced by, and the constitutional achievements of, widely admired leaders 
such as Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt.  My story is about a group of 
men who are usually ignored in law schools.  They are neglected because they are 
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widely regarded as failures and as not having made any constitutional difference 
worth mentioning.   
Yet, every President enters office with the hope of leaving the office in better 
shape than he found it.  They all try to protect the powers of their office, and some 
attempt to expand them.  Presidents are challenged by encroachments from the other 
branches, particularly Congress, and must consider when, if at all, to defer to 
Congress or to reach accommodations with Congress.  Presidents are further 
challenged to consider whether to curtail some congressional powers or to grab 
power abdicated by the Congress.  Some Presidents make more enduring 
constitutional legacies than others, but every President makes a difference 
constitutionally.   
My hope is to clarify the forgotten constitutional legacies of a number of 
American Presidents.  This is only a small sliver of constitutional law, but not an 
insignificant one at that.  My aim is to examine how the Presidents we commonly 
dismiss as constitutionally insignificant actually helped to shape the future of 
constitutional law.  How these Presidents (and their administrations) exercised 
power, even for as short a time as William Henry Harrison, changed the 
constitutional landscape.  I do not intend to make the case for rating these Presidents 
higher than historians or others usually do or for overstating what they accomplished 
in office.  Rather, my objective is to clarify their constitutional impact, which has 
been overshadowed or obscured by the brighter lights cast by some other Presidents.  
Yet, no one—not even Millard Fillmore—has occupied the office of the Presidency 
without leaving some imprint on both the office and our Constitution.   
The Presidents described herein as forgotten meet at least two criteria.  First, they 
are frequently remembered, if at all, for their mistakes in office.  They are commonly 
regarded as failures, though the reasons why may no longer be clear or known.  Their 
mistakes, or errors of judgment, are regarded as pertinent in constitutional studies 
only insofar as they set the stage for other Presidents or required correction by 
Presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom we regard as 
more constitutionally significant.  Second, the Presidents whom I will discuss did not 
invariably fail.  They all achieved something, even though many of us neglect their 
accomplishments and the implications of those accomplishments for understanding 
the construction of constitutional law.  Sometimes, the forgotten Presidents 
accomplished what they intended, and sometimes they did not.  In many instances, 
they made decisions with unintended constitutional consequences.  Perhaps, most 
importantly, these Presidents helped to shape the constitutional understandings of 
their day as well as constitutional practices that endure to this day.   
Constitutional practices, or understandings, that we take for granted did not 
merely come to life during the tenure of some great President.  In many instances, 
their foundation was laid, at least in part, by less significant—or less well-known or 
remembered—figures in constitutional history.  Indeed, the forgotten Presidents, 
with the assistance of Congress or their cabinets and supporters, helped to clarify and 
to construct constitutional law pertaining to such diverse matters as Presidential 
succession, executive privilege, the scope of a President’s nominating power, the 
scope of the House’s impeachment authority, territorial regulation, the requirements 
for statehood, Presidential emergency powers, and the basic relationship between 
Congress and the President in formulating domestic policy.       
By my calculations, at least 20 Presidents meet the criteria I have suggested 
(maybe more, depending on how others measure Presidential significance or apply 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/3
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my suggested criteria).  That strikes me as remarkable, because it means nearly half 
of our Presidents meet my criteria for being forgotten.  This result may be a function 
of the history we have forgotten, or perhaps never learned or took seriously, as a 
people.  Nevertheless, the phenomenon is striking given the popular obsession with 
the Presidency and the widespread acceptance of the Presidency as the most 
powerful—and maybe the most dangerous—of our federal institutions.  My paper is 
not about why some Presidents have been forgotten, but rather about the 
constitutional practices they helped to construct.  Their accomplishments and their 
failures are useful reminders of how people we have dismissed, or forgotten, as 
insignificant continue to influence what we think about the Constitution.  
II. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
John Quincy Adams is a good President with whom to begin.  He is probably 
best known less for what he did as President than for his having been one of two 
Presidential sons to be elected to the Presidency in his own right.  John Adams may 
have helped his son’s career more than once, but the son’s pre-Presidential career 
was remarkable nonetheless.1  Prior to becoming President, John Quincy Adams had 
served as, among other things, President James Madison’s Minister to Russia, United 
States Senator (at the same time he occupied a chair at Harvard), and President 
Monroe’s Secretary of State.  The Senate had even confirmed Adams’s nomination 
by President Madison to the Supreme Court, though Adams later decided not to take 
the job.2 
Adams came into office after the dramatic Presidential election of 1824.3  This 
was the first disputed election following the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment,4 
which had been designed to provide a process for fairly resolving the outcomes of 
Presidential contests in which no candidate had a majority in the Electoral College.  
Because no candidate in the 1824 election had won a majority in the Electoral 
College, the Twelfth Amendment (and the statutory mechanisms adopted pursuant to 
it) directed that the contest be turned over to the House of Representatives, which 
then would have the power to decide which among the top three vote-getters would 
become President.  Consequently, Adams’s Presidency began, in a sense, with the 
first significant test of the Twelfth Amendment.  The top three vote-getters in the 
1824 Presidential election were Adams, Andrew Jackson, and William Crawford.  
Henry Clay had finished fourth and was thereby excluded from further consideration 
for President.  Even so, Clay had enough clout to determine who would be President.   
One of the interesting dynamics of the race was that Adams actually liked 
Jackson personally and Jackson respected Adams.  Neither Adams nor Jackson liked 
Clay, and all three intensely disliked Crawford.  Adams, Jackson, and Clay also 
knew that Crawford, who had been serving with Adams in Monroe’s cabinet as 
                                                                
1See generally MARY W.M. HARGREAVES, THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 23-
24 (Donald R. McCoy et al. eds., 1985). 
2See Edward Pessen, John Quincy Adams, in THE PRESIDENTS: A REFERENCE HISTORY 
105, 106 (Henry F. Graff ed., 1984). 
3See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 36 (election was put before the House of 
Representatives when no Presidential candidate had majority in the electoral college). 
4U.S. CONST. amend. XII (the election of the President and Vice President). 
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Treasury Secretary, was not a viable candidate because he was an invalid; in fact, he 
had been paralyzed from a stroke.  Adams described Crawford as “a worm preying 
upon the vitals of the Administration within its own body.”5 Jackson believed 
Crawford had been behind an effort to force his resignation as the junior of the 
nation’s two major generals after Jackson had waged war against the Spanish in 
Florida while he was there to battle Indians.6  Jackson had entered the race in part to 
ensure Crawford’s defeat and to ensure his continued viability for state-wide office 
in Tennessee.  Much to his and others’ surprise, Jackson won the plurality of the 
popular vote.  
By process of elimination, Clay chose to support Adams.  He disliked the other 
three, but he shared Adams’s nationalist vision of a strong federal government.  Nine 
weeks before the House’s vote, he told his friends of his intention to support Adams.7  
Clay met privately with Adams in early January 1825 to convey his support.  The 
problem for both was that the meeting was an open secret; almost everyone who 
mattered politically knew about it.  Two days after the House voted for Adams, 
Adams announced that he had offered the position of Secretary of State to Clay and 
that Clay had accepted.  Clay had not only secured the Presidency for Adams, but 
also secured for himself the position that was then the stepping-stone to the 
Presidency. 
Jackson was livid.  He joined the public outcry against the “corrupt bargain” 
struck between Adams and Clay.8  He would ride the crest of that outrage to a 
decisive victory over Adams in the 1828 Presidential contest.   
Adams understood better than most that the outcome was not good.  Some 
months later, he confided in his diary that “perhaps two-thirds of the whole people 
[were] adverse to the actual result.”9 
Nevertheless, Adams began his Presidency with a strong vision of the Presidency 
that Sean Wilentz describes as “moral as well as political—nothing less, he said, than 
a ‘sacred’ duty and trust. . . . Adams wanted to mobilize the resources of the federal 
government to increase what the old Democratic-Republican societies had 
championed as ‘social virtue.’”10  Adams believed that “liberty is power” and that 
only the federal government had the constitutional authority allowing it to undertake 
an ambitious program of national improvements and to equip a strong army and 
navy.11  As President, Adams subscribed to an active theory of statesmanship and 
frequently went before Congress to advocate his vision of the future of the country.   
                                                                
55 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS OF 
HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 315 (Charles Francis Adams ed., AMS Press 1970) (1875). 
6SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 244 (2005). 
7See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 37. 
8Id. 
97 ADAMS, supra note 5, at 98. 
10WILENTZ, supra note 6, at 259 (quoting John Quincy Adams, First Annual Message 
(Dec. 6, 1825), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 299, 
311 (James D. Richardson ed., Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1896)).  
11Adams, supra note 10, at 316, quoted in WILENTZ, supra note 6, at 259.  
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Adams had what turned out to be an antiquated notion of appointments.  Unlike 
any later Presidents, he promised that he would not use patronage to staff his 
administration.  He pledged instead to place the government under the rule of 
“talents and virtue alone.”12  Adams’s peculiar notion was that appointments should 
go not to his political friends but to the worthy.  Consequently, he assembled a 
cabinet that was not invested in his bold initiatives.  Nor did Adams try to keep his 
cabinet in line by putting constraints on their use of patronage.  Instead, he allowed 
them to appoint his political enemies, including many of Henry Clay’s Republican 
followers and some Jacksonian Democrats.  Adams’s strategy did not produce a 
harmonious administration; it required that he do a great deal of work himself and 
alienated, in the estimation of one contemporary, “hundreds of his former friends,” 
who subsequently refused “to promote his reelection.”13  Half-way through his term, 
Adams was accomplishing so little and was so unpopular that he was already 
predicting Jackson would win the Presidential election in 1828.   
While Adams accomplished less than he would have liked, Congress approved 
many of the projects he had requested, including canals connecting the Chesapeake 
Bay to the Ohio and Delaware Rivers; national roads binding regions of the country 
together; and military academies that trained the brightest youths in the service of 
their country.  Adams strongly encouraged development of the nation’s intellect, and 
he requested that the Congress establish astronomical observatories, research centers, 
and other educational institutions that would transform the country into an 
enlightened republic.14 
The more Adams tried to invigorate and expand the powers of the national 
government, the less popular he became.  He did not know it, but he was working 
against a Jeffersonian grain among the voting public that distrusted the power of 
government—particularly the federal government—and believed that anything 
worthwhile had to come directly from the people.  Adams was the last of a 
generation of gentry-class leaders who refused to cater to the masses in order to stay 
in power.  As he and others predicted, the refusal cost him any chances for re-
election.   
In fact, Jackson trounced Adams in 1828.  Jackson won 68 percent of the 
electoral vote and nearly 60 percent of the popular vote.15  The latter figure 
represents a margin of victory that would not be surpassed for the rest of the 
nineteenth century.  Adams, stung by his defeat, followed the precedent set by his 
father—and ignored by most subsequent Presidents—of refusing to attend his 
successor’s inauguration.  
After leaving office, Adams did not disappear into obscurity.  Two years after 
leaving the Presidency, he was elected to the House of Representatives.  He served 
                                                                
12John Quincy Adams, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1825), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 10, at 294, 297, quoted in WILENTZ, 
supra note 6, at 259. 
13Letter from Joseph Durham Learned, Attorney & Editor, Federal Republican and 
Baltimore Telegraph, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State, United States of America (Sept. 27, 
1827), in 6 THE PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY 1077, 1079 (Mary W.M. Hargreaves & James F. 
Hopkins eds., 1982). 
14See WILENTZ, supra note 6, at 260. 
15See id. at 309. 
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for 17 years in the House, where his most notable achievement was ending the gag 
rule under which the House regularly voted to table petitions bearing on slavery or 
its abolition.16  A little more than a month after securing that victory, Adams suffered 
a fatal stroke on the floor of the House.  As he was rushed off the House floor and 
was waiting for medical assistance, he asked to speak privately to Henry Clay.  They 
made their peace in Adams’s last few moments of consciousness.  Adams lapsed into 
a coma and died on February 23, 1848. 
III. MARTIN VAN BUREN 
Martin Van Buren became President by one of the slimmest margins in American 
history.  He won just fifty-one percent of the popular vote against William Henry 
Harrison and two other regional Whig candidates.17  Although Democrats controlled 
the Congress, Van Buren lacked a working majority in the House and spent most of 
his time as President trying vainly to cobble coalitions together to support his 
polices. 
The first great issue Van Buren had to address was slavery.  Van Buren figured 
that the only way to maintain the unity of the Democratic party that he had helped to 
found was to take a Pro-Southern stance on slavery.  In his inaugural address, Van 
Buren pledged to “resist the slightest interference with [slavery] in the States where 
it exists,” and to veto any bill interfering with slavery.18  As proof of his good faith, 
Van Buren ordered that the fugitive slaves who had mutinied aboard the Spanish ship 
Amistad in July 1839 be returned to Cuba.  The order triggered a dispute that was 
eventually resolved by the Supreme Court.   
A stellar legal team was assembled on the slaves’ behalf.  The team included 
Connecticut Whig Roger Sherman Baldwin, Seth Staples (one of the founders of 
what would become Yale Law School), and Theodore Sedgwick III (a prominent 
lawyer and editor).19 
The Spanish insisted that the captives be released to their custody and that, under 
existing treaties, the United States had no authority to try a case involving Spanish 
subjects.  Van Buren agreed with the Spanish position; but with his re-election 
looming, he requested that Secretary of State John Forsyth order the United States 
Attorney to ensure that the Africans remain formally under the control of the 
President while the abolitionists got the hearing they wanted. 
Van Buren personally monitored the legal proceedings and did not hesitate to 
interfere when he felt the political necessity to do so.  While the Africans’ legal 
counsel persuaded Van Buren to order his State Department to release all relevant 
documents on the case to the defendants, Secretary of State Forsyth continued to 
                                                                
16See NORMA LOIS PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON AND JOHN 
TYLER 251 (Donald R. McCoy et al eds., 1989) (Adams’s motion to repeal the gag rule was 
approved by a vote of 108 to 80.). 
17See MAJOR L. WILSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF MARTIN VAN BUREN 19 (1984).  “Van Buren 
won 170 electoral votes . . . .  [His] popular margin was about 26,000 [votes], and a shift of 
2,183 votes in Pennsylvania alone could have . . . thrown the election into the House.”  Id. 
18Martin Van Buren, Inaugural Address, in THE PRESIDENTS SPEAK: THE INAUGURAL 
ADDRESSES OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 71, 78 (Davis Newton 
Lott ed., 1994). 
19See generally CHRISTOPHER MARTIN, THE AMISTAD AFFAIR (1970). 
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press for the conviction of the slaves.  After the circuit court ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction in the case, U.S. District Judge Judson ordered a new hearing, in his 
court, to settle the Spaniards’ property claims.  Almost everyone expected the Judge 
to rule in accordance with Van Buren’s preferences because he had been appointed 
by Van Buren and was well known for his hostility to abolition.   
Preparing for what he considered to be the inevitable verdict of the District 
Judge, Van Buren issued a secret executive order commanding the federal marshal to 
deliver, as soon as the proceedings ended, the prisoners to the schooner USS 
Grampus, which the Secretary of the Navy had ordered to stand by in New Haven.20  
Van Buren expected that the ship would take the slaves back to Havana, Cuba.  But, 
the Judge defied expectations by accepting the closing arguments of Baldwin and 
Sedgwick and ordering the slaves returned to Africa.21  Van Buren was embarrassed 
by the ruling and even more by the public disclosure of his orders, made beforehand, 
to return the Africans to Cuba.  In spite of the reputation he had built as a magician 
in orchestrating legislative outcomes, Van Buren’s machinations backfired.  He had 
alienated Northerners by appearing to be catering to slaveholders while the lower 
court decision had alienated southerners.   
Van Buren, through his Secretary of State, ordered the United States Attorney to 
appeal the District Judge’s decision to the Supreme Court.  Pending the appeal, the 
defense added John Quincy Adams to the team.  Opening arguments in the Court 
were scheduled to begin ten days before the next Presidential inauguration. 
By then, Van Buren was a lame duck and nearly out of office.  While Democrats 
re-nominated Van Buren and made him the first major party nominee to receive a 
party platform, he lost his rematch with Harrison badly.  In the meantime, the case 
had been delayed because of the unexpected death of Justice Philip Barbour.22  When 
the case was finally argued, Adams closed the Africans’ case.  His argument before 
the Court was more political than legal.  Near its end, he famously directed the 
justices’ attention to two framed copies of the Declaration of Independence that hung 
in the room: “The moment you come, to the Declaration of Independence, that every 
man has a right to life and liberty, an inalienable right, this case is decided.  I ask 
nothing more in behalf of these unfortunate men, than this Declaration.”23  Eight 
days later, the Court, 7-1 in an opinion by Justice Story, ruled in favor of the 
Amistad defense, declaring that the rebels had never been slaves and ordered them 
freed once and for all.24 
Van Buren’s second great challenge—the nation’s first depression—occurred in 
the interim between his election and inauguration.  In response to the dramatic 
                                                                
20See generally IYUNOLU FOLAYAN OSAGIE, THE AMISTAD REVOLT (2000); JOHN QUINCY 
ADAMS, ARGUMENT IN THE CASE OF UNITED STATES VS. CINQUE 84 (McPherson & Katz eds., 
Arno Press & New York Times 1969) (1841) (questioning why the Secretary of the Navy 
moved the USS Grampus to New Haven just three days before Judge Judson’s decision was 
delivered). 
21See ADAMS, supra note 20, at 69. 
22See id. at 53-54 (“Death of Judge Barbour—The Proceedings of the Court Suspended. . . 
. Feb. 25, 1841.”). The trial resumed March 1, 1841.  Id. at 54.  
23Id. at 89. 
24United States v. Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841). 
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economic downturn, Van Buren requested a special session of Congress.25  His 
principal proposal was a unique sub-treasury bill.  He envisioned a system of 
depositories to hold national funds, replacing the network of “pet banks” favored by 
Jackson.  The Whigs blocked it as long as they could, until finally in 1840 the 
Congress enacted Van Buren’s Independent Treasury Act.  Until then, Van Buren 
relied on his executive prerogatives, ordering collecting officers to hold public funds 
rather than deposit them in state banks, many of which had failed.  As a result, the 
vast majority of treasury expenditures in 1838 were made by drafts drawn on 
collecting officers, in effect creating the sub-treasury network by fiat. 
Van Buren responded to the depression further by what he called “retrenchment 
and reform.”26  He cut public expenditures by twenty percent and opposed internal 
improvements that would have helped to alleviate national unemployment.  The 
cutbacks cost him political support, partly because he was no longer allowing the 
Congress to invest in the nation’s infrastructure and because he was continuing to 
spend money rather lavishly on the White House.  While Van Buren’s proposal of an 
independent treasury was prescient, it was a radical departure from the premise upon 
which his party had been based.27  It split Democratic unity. 
Van Buren’s proposal for an independent treasury was not his only innovative 
initiative.  At the outset of his Presidency, he decided not to maintain Jackson’s 
reliance on a kitchen cabinet for advice.  Instead, Van Buren restored the cabinet’s 
traditional role by conducting weekly meetings and soliciting advice from 
department heads.  Moreover, Van Buren took the unusual step of condemning a 
miscarriage of justice in Syria; namely, the imprisonment and torture of several Jews 
in order to get them to confess to murdering a priest there.  Van Buren authorized his 
Secretary of State, John Forsyth, to condemn the treatment of the Jews and to direct 
the Mohammed Ali of Syria “to employ, should the occasion arise, all those good 
offices and efforts which are compatible with discretion and your official character, 
to the end that justice and humanity may be extended to these persecuted people 
whose cry of distress has reached our shores.”28  Subsequently, two prominent 
French Jews met with Mohammed Ali and successfully negotiated the unconditional 
release and exoneration of the nine Jewish prisoners who were still alive.  (At least 
four other Jews are known not to have survived the ordeal.)  
Despite losing to William Henry Harrison in 1840, Van Buren remained active in 
politics.  He tried for the Presidency again in 1844, but he ended up opposing the 
annexation of Texas at exactly the same time as his rival Henry Clay did.  Their joint 
opposition to the annexation hurt them both.  To some, it looked like another corrupt 
bargain, while most of the public actually supported annexation of Texas.  Thus, 
with one stroke, each knocked himself out as a Presidential contender. 
                                                                
25See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 22. 
26Martin Van Buren, Third Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1839), in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 10, at 529, 554. 
27See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 22 (Van Buren recommended the creation of an 
Independent Treasury.). 
28Letter from John Forsyth, Secretary of State, United States of America, to John Gliddon, 
United States Consul at Alexandria, Egypt (Aug. 14, 1840), quoted in Martin Van Buren, in 
DAVID G. DALIN & ALFRED J. KOLATCH, THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
JEWS 38, 41 (2000).  
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IV. WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON 
William Henry Harrison is not usually regarded as having achieved anything 
significant as President, except perhaps for dying.  Yet, he was distinctive for many 
reasons.  First, he was the oldest person elected President up until then.  Second, 
Harrison delivered the longest inaugural address of any President (nearly two hours).  
Third, he was—as perhaps many a school child knows—the first President to die in 
office.  Fourth, he was the first person elected President to vow to serve but a single 
term.  Fifth, his service as President is the shortest ever.  Sixth, he was the first 
Ohioan elected President.29  Seventh, Harrison appointed the first Jew to a 
judgeship—Mordecai Manuel Noah.   
Harrison was distinctive for the additional reason that he had a remarkable record 
of public service prior to becoming President.  His prior public service was nearly as 
extensive as that of John Quincy Adams, including serving in such diverse offices as 
an officer in the army, Secretary of the Northwest Territory, territorial Governor of 
Indiana, Major General in the Army, a member of the House, a member of the Ohio 
Senate, a United States Senator, Minister to Columbia, and clerk of the county court 
of common pleas.  It was from the latter position that he ran successfully as the 
Whigs’ candidate for the Presidency in 1840.   
After Harrison’s victory, Henry Clay met more than once with Harrison to offer 
suggestions on what Harrison should do as President.  Clay figured that he could 
dominate the administration since he was the most prominent member of the Whig 
party.  In their final meeting barely two weeks after the inauguration, Harrison made 
clear that he, not Clay, would be in charge of the administration.  It was one of the 
last times the two would ever speak.  Clay had managed to alienate Harrison, and he 
ended up wielding no power with the administration as long as Harrison was 
President.30  It turned out that Clay’s exile was shorter than either he or Harrison 
expected. 
In his lengthy, long-winded inaugural, Harrison expressed support for the 
principle of a limited executive and for congressional leadership on domestic 
policies.  He promised restraint to not overuse the veto nor employ patronage to 
enhance his authority.  He vowed that the Congress should control the public 
revenue; the further the President was removed from control of public revenue, the 
more wholesome the arrangement.  To demonstrate his vigor during the nearly two-
hour oration, Harrison chose to brave the icy wind without a hat or overcoat.  He 
caught a bad cold that weakened him and eventually made him vulnerable to the 
pneumonia that killed him. 
Harrison died after calling a special congressional session to address the 
country’s financial conditions.  Andrew Jackson, never one to mince words, was 
jubilant, remarking that a “kind of overruling providence has interfered to prolong 
our glorious Union and happy republican system which General Harrison and his 
cabinet was preparing to destroy under the dictation of that profligate demagogue, 
Henry Clay.”31  Jackson turned out to be wrong both about Clay and Harrison’s 
successor. 
                                                                
29See generally id. at 42. 
30See id. at 34, 37. 
31Letter from Andrew Jackson, Former President, United States of America, to Francis 
Blair, Editor, Washington Globe (Apr. 19, 1841), quoted in WILENTZ, supra note 6, at 522.  
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
476 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:467 
V. JOHN TYLER 
At 51, John Tyler was the youngest man at that point to become President.  Polk, 
who succeeded him, would be younger (and the youngest until Teddy Roosevelt).32  
Much to everyone’s surprise, Tyler proceeded to have one of the most contentious 
Presidencies ever, including several notable (but largely forgotten) constitutional 
achievements. 
Since Harrison was the first President to die in office, Tyler’s status was 
uncertain.  The Constitution says “the Same shall devolve on the Vice-President,”33 
but the antecedent of this phrase is unclear: “The Same” may refer to “the powers 
and duties of the office” (in which case Tyler would remain Vice-President) or to the 
office itself (in which case Tyler would become President).  The Whigs favored the 
former interpretation, not surprisingly, because Tyler was not a Whig.  They thus 
addressed Tyler, when he arrived in Washington after Harrison’s death, as “Vice-
President, Acting as President.”  Others, less discrete, referred to Tyler as “His 
Accidency.”34  Tyler insisted on being called “President Tyler,” and he soon got 
Congress to agree with him.  Throughout his Presidency, he refused to open any mail 
addressed to “Acting President Tyler.”35  Subsequently, the example set by Tyler was 
codified as an amendment to the Constitution.    
Tyler’s first order of business was to convene a special session of Congress, at 
which Henry Clay pressed for a banking bill designed to overturn Jacksonian 
banking policies by abolishing the sub-treasuries created by Van Buren and 
resurrecting the National Bank that Jackson had killed.36  Near the end of the session, 
Tyler vetoed a compromise measure drafted by Daniel Webster with cabinet 
approval.  Two days after the veto, all cabinet secretaries (except Secretary of State 
Webster) resigned in protest of Tyler’s refusal to abide by Harrison’s policy 
preferences.  Once Congress adjourned, the Whigs issued a statement disassociating 
them from Tyler.  He was now a man without a party, given that he had left the 
Democrats to join Harrison’s ticket.  Whigs called for his resignation, but Tyler 
refused to resign.  Tyler, who had twice resigned from the Senate in protest, stood 
his ground. 
Using recess appointments to avoid confirmation votes that he knew his 
nominees would not win, Tyler formed a cabinet of Democrats.  He blocked Whig 
bills that would have distributed among the States the receipts from the sale of public 
lands to pay for public works and other internal improvements.37  Frustrated Whigs 
attempted to censure Tyler.38  Led by John Quincy Adams, a Whig-dominated Select 
                                                                
32PETERSON, surpa note 16, at 45. 
33U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
34See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 50. 
35See ROBERT SEAGER II, AND TYLER TOO: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN AND JULIA GARDINER 
TYLER 149 (1963). 
36See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 60 (Clay “erroneously declared that the election of 1840 
was a referendum on the bank and said that he had in mind a perfect plan for such an 
institution.”). 
37See id. at 103-05.   
38See id. at 105-06.   
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Committee of Thirteen charged in a report to the House that Tyler had misused his 
veto power to such an extent that the misuse constituted an impeachable abuse of 
power.  This became the first time an impeachment resolution had been introduced in 
the House and a committee had formally recommended a President’s impeachment.  
As Jackson had done when he had been censured,39 Tyler responded with a formal 
“Protest” in which he defended his conduct.40  Taunting the Whigs, Tyler declared 
that if he had committed a genuine impeachable offense, Congress had the authority 
to remove him from office; it had no authority, in his judgment, to issue any lesser 
sanction, including a committee’s censure. 
The lame duck session of the 27th Congress was replete with proposals either to 
impeach Tyler or to require his production of internal White House documents.  In 
opposing these measures, Tyler fortified basic executive prerogatives, particularly 
executive privilege.  Representative John Minor Botts of Virginia introduced nine 
impeachment resolutions against Tyler, all accusing him, in one way or another, of 
abusing his powers.  In response, Tyler made the strongest statement thus far by a 
chief executive on the President’s right to use discretion in complying or refusing to 
comply with congressional requests or demands for information from the executive 
branch.  He refused to comply with a formal House request for all correspondence 
relating to the Maine boundary negotiations with Great Britain.  In March 1842, 
Tyler refused another House request, this time for the names of any members of the 
26th and 27th Congresses who had been applicants for office and for details of their 
applications, whether they had applied in person or through friends, and, if the latter, 
whether the friends made recommendations in person or in writing.  In his refusal to 
comply with the request, Tyler explained that appointments were a concern of the 
Senate, not the House, and that the applications were confidential.  When Tyler 
refused to produce documents relating to negotiations between the War Department 
and the Cherokee nation, the House adopted yet another resolution stating that it had 
the right to demand from the executive branch any information in the latter’s 
possession relating to matters on which the House was deliberating.  It further 
directed the President to produce all data relating to an executive investigation of 
fraud in land sales to the Cherokee Indians.  In January 1843, Tyler responded with 
another vigorous defense of executive privilege.  He characterized the House’s 
refusal to recognize a President’s entitlement to executive privilege as “equivalent to 
the denial of its possession by him and would render him dependent upon that branch 
in the performance of a duty purely executive.”41  
Tyler was just as aggressive in asserting and trying to expand Presidential power 
in foreign affairs.  His primary interest was the annexation of Texas.42  When Tyler 
announced his support for the annexation of Texas as a slaveholding state, Webster 
                                                                
39See id. at 14 (In December of 1833, Clay called upon the Senate to censure Jackson for 
“open, palpable, and daring usurpation.”  The resolution passed 26 to 20.). 
40See id. at 106 (In his protest, “Tyler expressed his resolution to uphold the constitutional 
authority of the executive to his utmost ability and in defiance of all personal consequences.”). 
41John Tyler, Special Message to the House of Representatives (Jan. 31, 1843), in 4 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 10, at 220, 222 
(1897), quoted in PETERSON, supra note 16, at 172.  
42See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 176. 
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resigned in opposition, and Tyler appointed Calhoun as his Secretary of State.  
Calhoun drew up a treaty to annex Texas; but the Whigs, almost without exception, 
opposed it.  Although the Senate rejected the treaty, Tyler sent it to the House, which 
he asked to initiate the process of annexation by joint resolution.   
Yet another constitutional challenge arose when civil war effectively broke out 
over the rightful government of the State of Rhode Island.43  The war pitted the 
conservative state legislature against the leader of the state’s reform movement, 
Thomas Wilson Dorr.  After Dorr was seemingly elected, the legislature declared his 
election illegal.  It tried to arrest him under newly passed treason laws.  Eventually, 
Dorr would return to the State, be imprisoned, and then freed due to the efforts of 
Democratic leaders in the State.  Tyler had decided earlier to send federal troops to 
preserve the former government and to keep Dorr from taking over the State.  Later, 
the Supreme Court ruled, in Luther v. Borden,44 that the judiciary lacked the 
authority to define what constituted a republican form of government.     
On February 28, 1844, the administration and the country were confronted with a 
terrible tragedy:  Tyler, members of his cabinet, and various dignitaries had taken a 
cruise on the Potomac on the most modern ship in the Navy, the Princeton.45  On the 
homeward trip, the ship fired its huge gun for the entertainment of those on board.  
Unfortunately, the gun exploded.  Eight people were killed, including the Secretaries 
of War and the Navy, and nine people, including Senator Thomas Hart Benton, were 
injured.  Tyler chose John Calhoun as his Secretary of War, and Calhoun, to no one’s 
surprise, strongly supported the annexation of Texas as a slaveholding state.  While 
the appointment satisfied southerners, it merely alienated Tyler further from the rest 
of the country. 
Tyler never ceased to take a bold approach to making appointments.  In the last 
two years of his administration, the Senate rejected a majority of his nominations, 
including Caleb Cushing’s nomination as Treasury Secretary three times.  The 
Senate rejected five of Tyler’s six nominations to the Supreme Court.  Tyler’s only 
successful Court appointment, Samuel Nelson, served with distinction from 1845-
1872.  Nelson had appeal as a relatively apolitical Whig and particularly as a widely 
respected Chief Judge of the New York Supreme Court.  Since Nelson was a Whig, 
Tyler became the first President to nominate someone from outside his party to the 
Supreme Court.46 
Near the end of his Presidency, Tyler had become unpopular with both Whigs 
and Democrats.  His only support came from a renegade convention of Whigs and 
Democrats, who nominated him for the Presidency.  He opted out of the race when 
Polk, the Democratic nominee, assured him that Tyler’s followers would be accepted 
into the ranks of the Democratic party.47 
                                                                
43See WILENTZ, supra note 6, at 540-41. 
44Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
45See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 201-03. 
46See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 56 (rev. ed., 2003). 
47See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 238 (Though Jackson had forbid any publication of 
such an agreement, Walker had originally suggested Polk and Jackson go so far as to write a 
letter “welcoming Tyler and his friends back into the party.”). 
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After Polk’s election (over Clay), Tyler attempted, yet again, to engineer the 
annexation of Texas.  He brokered a deal in which the House and Senate each 
approved a joint resolution endorsing the annexation of Texas.48  It was widely 
expected that Tyler would allow Polk to sign the resolution, which empowered the 
President to offer Texas prompt admission as a state into the Union with certain 
conditions attached or to negotiate the terms and conditions under which it could be 
admitted with Texas authorities.  Polk favored the second option, but Tyler favored 
the first.  So, Tyler did not allow Polk to sign the resolution.  Instead, he did, and he 
sent an agent to Texas offering Texas statehood under the first option.  When Polk 
entered office, he did not call the emissary back.  He would finish what Tyler started. 
VI. JAMES K. POLK 
Throughout his political career, James Polk was known as Young Hickory, 
because he was from Tennessee and his mentor was Andrew Jackson.  Polk was also 
the first dark horse elected President.  He was selected as the Democratic nominee on 
the ninth ballot after it appeared that the convention was going to be deadlocked.49  
Though not widely known or remembered by many contemporary Americans, Polk 
may have had the most successful one-term Presidency yet.     
To preserve party unity, Polk pledged that, if elected, he would serve only a 
single term.50  Polk did not, however, intend to serve as a lame duck.  Once he 
entered office, Polk privately disclosed to some cabinet officers that he had four 
objectives: (1) to pass a tariff that would be acceptable to Northerners and 
Southerners, (2) to bring order to the country’s banking system by establishing an 
independent treasury, (3) to complete negotiations with the British to settle the 
Oregon boundary, and (4) to acquire California from Mexico.51  He might have 
added a fifth—completing the acquisition of Texas.  It was an ambitious agenda, just 
as had been his decision to put together a cabinet of his own choosing (rather than 
one that would appease other party leaders or factions).  Though Polk won the 
Presidency by a slim margin, he vowed, “to be myself President of the U. S.”52 
                                                                
48
“Tyler was ready to use every means possible to induce the House and the Senate to act 
on a joint resolution during the final session of the Twenty-eighth Congress . . . .  He had been 
preparing his message since October . . . .”  Id. at 250.  The resolution was passed and Tyler 
signed it on March 1, 1845 with only three days left of his Presidency.  Id. at 257.  
49See PAUL H. BERGERON, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES K. POLK 16 (Donald R. McCoy et al. 
eds., 1987) (After seven ballots at the conclave in Baltimore, the convention had reached a 
stalemate.). 
50See id. at 17 (Though the platform did not call for this pledge, Polk felt such a promise 
would preserve unity in the party.). 
51See CHARLES A. MCCOY, POLK AND THE PRESIDENCY 50 (Haskell House Publishers 
1973) (1960).  
52Letter from James K. Polk, President Elect, United States of America, to Cave Johnson, 
Representative from Tennessee, United States House of Representatives (Dec. 21, 1844), 
quoted in EUGENE IRVING MCCORMAC, JAMES K. POLK: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 287 (Russell 
& Russell Inc. 1965) (1922); CHARLES SELLERS, JAMES K. POLK: CONTINENTALIST 164-65 
(1966). 
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Polk achieved these five objectives and more.  One of his other accomplishments 
included the founding of the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis.53  He 
oversaw the addition of the western third of the continental United States to the 
national domain, including California, Oregon, and the Southwest.  In the process, he 
restated and refined the Monroe Doctrine.54  His administration added 1.2 million 
square miles of territory to the country—far more than any other administration 
before or since—and the enormous value of this territory was underscored by the 
discovery of gold in California.55 
Polk ran his cabinet in a unique way.  First, the price he exacted for appointing 
someone to the cabinet was the appointee’s pledge not to run for the Presidency.  
The only cabinet member to resist was James Buchanan, whom Polk had asked to 
become Secretary of State.  Not surprisingly, as a consequence, the two often 
clashed.  Buchanan made daily visits to the White House, because Polk did not trust 
Buchanan and wanted to monitor foreign affairs closely.  At one point, Buchanan 
agonized over Polk’s offer to appoint him to the Supreme Court, but he ultimately 
declined the offer.  Many people suspect that Polk had made the offer to get 
Buchanan out of his cabinet.  Moreover, Polk used his cabinet as a sounding board.  
Holding cabinet meetings twice a week, he opened all subjects to discussion, though 
he often kept his own opinions secret until he was ready to act. 
“In his handling of Congress, Polk was the first President consistently to mount 
campaigns for administrative measures, and he exercised a degree of control unique 
in the period between Jackson and Lincoln . . . .”56  Like his mentor Jackson, Polk 
did not back down from confrontations with the Senate.  In 1845, he decided to 
nominate George Woodward to the Supreme Court, ignoring the fact that Simon 
Cameron had just beaten Woodward to become one of Pennsylvania’s two 
Senators.57  Cameron urged his colleagues to reject the nomination as a personal 
insult, and he persuaded five Democrats and several Whigs to vote against the 
nomination.  Polk thought he might be able to break Cameron’s grip on the Senate 
by nominating Buchanan, who once served as one of Pennsylvania’s Senators and 
retained influence in the State.  As Buchanan, characteristically, fretted over the 
decision, and before he made any final decision, Polk decided to nominate to the 
Court a Pennsylvanian more agreeable to Cameron; Robert Grier.  Grier’s close 
                                                                
53See DUNCAN A. BRUCE, THE MARK OF THE SCOTS 53 (1998) (“[Polk] founded the US 
Naval Academy, authorized the Smithsonian Institution, and created the Department of the 
Interior.”). 
54See BERGERON, supra note 49, at 123.  The Monroe doctrine asserted a sphere of 
influence in the Americas exclusive to the United States, in return for which the U.S. would 
remain neutral in European conflicts.  Id.  Polk used the Monroe doctrine in support of the 
westward expansion during his Presidency.  Id.  
55See THOMAS R. HIETALA, MANIFEST DESIGN: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND EMPIRE 
121 (rev. ed. 2003) (1985). 
56See David M. Pletcher, James K. Polk, in THE PRESIDENTS: A REFERENCE HISTORY, 
supra note 2, at 183, 186.  
57See GERHARDT, supra note 46, at 146. 
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friendship with Buchanan would become extremely important years later when the 
Court was deciding Dred Scott v. Sandford.58 
In several ways, Polk’s handling of the armed forces established precedents for 
subsequent Presidents.  By stationing troops in disputed territory on the border of 
Mexico, he was able to provoke Mexico into war without prior recourse to 
Congress.59  (Abraham Lincoln, then in his only term in the House, supported a 
resolution condemning Polk for waging an illegal war with Mexico and introduced 
another calling upon Polk to point out the spot where the United States had been 
invaded by Mexican forces.60)  “In fighting the war Polk [exceeded] Madison . . . in 
the number of detailed orders he issued to his generals . . . thereby reasserting the 
traditional American assumption of civilian control of the military.”61  This 
infuriated Taylor, whom Polk tried to discharge; but congressional support made his 
removal impossible.  He recognized the limitations of his experience and often had 
to defer to the Whig generals in the field, Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor.  Once 
the battle with Mexico ensued, Polk sought ratification and support from Congress.  
The war bill passed by an impressive margin.62  
VII. ZACHARY TAYLOR 
Zachary Taylor became the third war hero elected to the Presidency.  He ran as a 
Whig, though he had been apolitical as a general and few, if any, had any sense of 
his political preferences at the time he ran for the Presidency.  The first time Taylor 
took political stands was as a Presidential candidate.  As the Whig candidate, he 
expressed his belief that Congress, not the President, should have complete control 
of the major issues before the country.  Yet, he took George Washington as his 
model and sought not to be “the slave of a party instead of the chief magistrate of the 
nation.”63  Using Washington as his model, Taylor vainly tried to govern above 
sordid partisanship.   
At the time he ran for office, what most people knew about Taylor was that he 
had been a successful general in the Mexican War.  In fact, the Mexican War 
provided the most significant opportunity prior to the Civil War for young 
Americans interested in the military to get experience in combat.  Serving under 
Taylor were two young officers, Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant, and Jefferson 
                                                                
58Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
59See BERGERON, supra note 47, at 81. 
60See MCCOY, supra note 51, at 155.  This was Lincoln’s maiden address before Congress, 
and on January 3, 1848, the House passed a formal resolution by a vote of 85 to 81 that the 
war had been “unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United 
States.”  CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1847), quoted in MCCOY, supra note 51, at 
155.  
61See Pletcher, supra note 56, at 188. 
62See MCCOY, supra note 51, at 118-19 (The bill passed in the House by a vote of 174 to 
14, the Senate took a day to debate the bill but then supported Polk by a vote of 42 to 2.). 
63Zachary Taylor, General, United States Army, to R. C. Wood, Surgeon, United States 
Army (Sept. 27, 1847), quoted in ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCIES OF ZACHARY TAYLOR 
& MILLARD FILLMORE 40 (Donald R. McCoy et al. eds., 1988). 
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Davis, another West Point graduate, was his son-in-law.64  Taylor would remember 
Lee as an outstanding officer but had little, if any, recollection of Grant.  Grant, 
however, would not only remember Taylor, but also emulate his preference to forego 
formal military attire.  Taylor was Grant’s model of a successful general.65  He 
became a model of leadership for another Whig who would become President, 
Abraham Lincoln, who had campaigned for Taylor and strongly supported him.   
In fashioning his cabinet and administration, Taylor deliberately left his Vice-
President, Millard Fillmore, in the cold.66  Taylor did not know Fillmore before he 
became his Vice-President.  Nor did Fillmore control the patronage in New York.  
He had lost control of New York patronage to William Seward and Thurlow Weed, 
who wielded considerable power both in their home state and the Whig party in 
those days.  Fillmore had been chosen as Vice-President because he was an old-line 
Whig who would counter-balance Taylor’s meager Whig credentials. 
Taylor turned out not to be as much of a Whig as his supporters had hoped.  He 
had surprisingly strong opinions about the major constitutional and political issue of 
the day: Whether to allow the admission of California into the Union as a free state.67  
In 1849, there were 15 slave states and 15 free states, so that there was equality 
among the states in the Senate.  Taylor did not equivocate.  He favored California’s 
admission as a free state and, thus, angered southerners.  His policies further divided 
the House.  Taylor stood his ground.  In his inaugural, he advocated the immediate 
recognition of California’s statehood under its new constitution, and he noted that 
New Mexico would soon be asking for admission.  He strongly repeated “the solemn 
warning of the first and most illustrious of my predecessors against furnishing ‘any 
ground for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations.’”68  Taylor 
reminded members of Congress that their first obligation was to the nation, not to 
slavery.  It is not hard to see why Lincoln admired Taylor. 
What followed was an enormous drive to reach a compromise in Congress that 
would keep the nation whole and avoid civil war.  Like the Missouri Compromise in 
1820, the compromise suggested in 1848 consisted of several laws.  Consequently, it 
was more, as Sean Wilentz suggests, “of a balancing act, a truce that delayed, but 
could not prevent, even greater crises over slavery.”69  Henry Clay led the initial 
effort.  Clay proposed an omnibus bill linking California’s admission to the Union 
with several other measures, including abolition of slave trade in the District of 
Columbia and a strong fugitive slave law.  It also would establish new territories in 
Utah and New Mexico and leave the question of whether to permit or forbid slavery 
up to the citizens of those territories.  The plan sparked impassioned speeches from 
Daniel Webster, William Seward, and John Calhoun.  A critical moment occurred 
                                                                
64SMITH, supra note 63, at 1. 
65See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, GRANT 40 (2001). 
66See GERHARDT, supra note 46, at 54. 
67See SMITH, supra note 63, at 65 (noting the debate over the admission of California as a 
free state was fierce between Southern Whigs, Northerners and Democrats). 
68Zachary Taylor, First Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1849), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 10, at 9, 19 (1897). 
69See WILENTZ, supra note 6, at 637. 
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when Stephen Douglas surprisingly turned against Taylor and sided with Clay’s 
efforts toward compromise.  It was important because it revealed Democratic ties to 
Clay.  Douglas praised Clay for proposing a solution to the issues before the country.  
Douglas prepared a series of bills giving something to each of the contending sides.  
In those preparations lie the foundations for what would become the Great 
Compromise of 1850.70  
Taylor was so alienated by zealous secessionists (including his son-in-law 
Jefferson Davis) that he vowed to hang them if they ever carried out their threats.  He 
blocked any effort at compromise.  To end the dispute over which territories would 
be allowed to join the Union, Taylor urged settlers in New Mexico and California to 
bypass the territorial stage and draft constitutions and apply for statehood.  
Southerners were furious, because neither state’s constitution was likely to allow 
slavery.  Whigs in Congress were dismayed, because they felt the President was 
usurping their prerogatives.  At the end of March, John Calhoun died, depriving 
southern extremists of their most powerful and revered leader.  With no one 
immediately filling the void left by Calhoun, Clay worked furiously to put together a 
compromise.  He, like almost everyone else, believed the silence from the White 
House was simply a reflection of Taylor’s steadfast refusal to compromise.  In fact, it 
was not.  Taylor had contracted cholera, and he died on July 9, 1852.   
VIII. MILLARD FILLMORE 
Zachary Taylor’s death thrust Vice-President Millard Fillmore onto center stage 
and the national limelight.  Fillmore was the second Vice-President to ascend to the 
Presidency after a President’s death in office.  He had once been a powerful member 
of the House, including service as Chairman of its Ways and Means Committee.71  
After losing the race for Governor of New York, Fillmore became Comptroller of 
New York.  It was from this office that he accepted the nomination as Taylor’s Vice-
President.   
Throughout the 16 months of his Presidency, Taylor had marginalized Fillmore.72  
The cabinet, following Taylor’s lead, did not look to Fillmore for advice and 
shunned his friends and allies.   
So, it was no surprise that as soon as Fillmore became President, Taylor’s entire 
cabinet offered their resignations, and Fillmore accepted them all.73  Fillmore only 
wanted Whigs committed to the national government’s success in his cabinet.74  
Webster became his Secretary of State, John Crtittenden became Attorney General, 
and Thomas Corwin, a popular Whig from Ohio, became Secretary of the Treasury.  
With Fillmore as President, the drift toward chaos and uncertainty abruptly ended.  
                                                                
70See generally MARK J. STEGMAIER, TEXAS, NEW MEXICO, & THE COMPROMISE OF 1850: 
BOUNDARY DISPUTE AND SECTIONAL CRISIS (1996) (The Great Compromise, also called the 
Pearce Act, was a series of Congressional legislative measures addressing slavery and the 
boundaries of territories acquired during the Mexican-American War.). 
71See SMITH, supra note 63, at 159 (Fillmore had received great praise for his work as 
chairman.). 
72See GERHARDT, supra note 46, at 54.   
73See id. 
74See ROBERT J. SCARRY, MILLARD FILLMORE 169 (2001). 
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Compromise was the order of the day.  Fillmore’s cabinet, all reflecting his 
preference for compromise, altered the political climate in Washington.  Northern 
Whigs who once supported Taylor shifted to Fillmore, and some Southern Whigs 
moved back into the Whig mainstream.   
Though Clay seized the moment to try to push his omnibus bill through the 
Senate, his effort failed.  The ambitious young senator from Illinois, Stephen 
Douglas, wasted no time in taking advantage of Clay’s failure.  With Clay depleted 
from his failure, Douglas introduced a series of bills seriatim rather than as a whole.  
Each bill passed in the Senate.  The House, under Douglas’s guidance, passed all 
compromise measures.  Congress, thus, approved the Great Compromise of 1850, 
which Fillmore signed.75  
Although the Great Compromise of 1850 helped to allay concerns about 
secession, it may have made secession more likely.  The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 
part of the Great Compromise, helped the movement toward secession by placing 
federal enforcement agencies at the disposal of slaveholders.76  Abolitionists in the 
North were outraged.  Fillmore’s enforcement of the Act produced what one critic 
termed “an era of slave-hunting and kidnapping.”77 
The Great Compromise, as it turned out, was not the only controversy 
commanding Fillmore’s attention.  Texas, supported by other slaveholding states, 
threatened to invade New Mexico and forcefully take land that it considered its 
own.78  If Texas made any move, it might have started the Civil War.  Fillmore did 
not hesitate.  To discourage an invasion, he sent 750 more federal troops to New 
Mexico and reminded the Governor of Texas that the boundary between Texas and 
New Mexico had been established by treaty and that the New Mexico territory 
belonged to the United States.  A few months later, he learned that South Carolinians 
were preparing to seize the federal forts in Charleston as a first step toward 
secession.79  Again acting quickly, Fillmore strengthened the Charleston forts, posted 
troops in North and South Carolina, and urged General Winfield Scott to develop a 
contingency plan in case an armed insurrection should occur. 
Fillmore bluntly told Congress that if the laws of the United States are opposed 
and obstructed in any state or territory by combinations too powerful to be 
suppressed by the judicial or civil authorities, it is the duty of the President to either 
call out the militia, employ the military and naval force of the United States, or to do 
                                                                
75See SMITH, supra note 63, at 188, 195. 
76See id. at 189 (The Fugitive Slave bill passed in the House with a vote of 109 to 76 three 
days after the Senate accepted the House’s combination of Texas and New Mexico.). 
77See 2 HOLMAN HAMILTON, ZACHARY TAYLOR: SOLDIER IN THE WHITE HOUSE 404 
(Archon Books 1966) (1951). 
78See SMITH, supra note 63, at 191.  During his Presidency, Taylor said that he would 
defend New Mexico in person, if necessary.  Id. at 191.  Following Taylor’s death, Fillmore 
stated that Taylor’s policy remained unchanged; New Mexico belonged to the United States.  
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both if, in his judgment, the exigency of the occasion should so require.80  In the face 
of such opposition, the Texas delegation backed down, and the crisis subsided for a 
while. 
Meanwhile, the Fugitive Slave Law met stiff resistance in the North.  Many 
northerners denied the law’s legitimacy and refused to uphold its provisions.  Some 
northern states passed personal liberty laws that attempted to nullify the federal 
legislation.81  Resisting these challenges to federal authority, Fillmore consistently 
authorized the use of federal force to assist local officials in carrying out the return of 
fugitive slaves.82  
Fillmore’s enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act came to a head in 1851.83  
Christiana, Pennsylvania was a Quaker settlement that welcomed fugitive slaves.  
But, in 1851, a Maryland slaveholder named Edward Gorsuch arrived there to claim 
two fugitive slaves.  When they resisted with the help of other African-Americans 
present, Gorsuch was shot to death, and his son was seriously injured.  Fillmore 
decided to try to end northern resistance to the Fugitive Slave law once and for all.  
A large force of federal marines rounded up nearly forty prisoners, including thirty 
African-Americans.  They were charged with treason, which led the largest treason 
trial in American history.  But, the charge that these people were waging war against 
the United States lacked credibility, even if they were guilty of some crimes.  After 
the first defendant was cleared of the charges, the rest were let go. 
When Daniel Webster formally announced that he was running for the 
Presidency in 1850, Fillmore decided not to run.  Fillmore’s friends talked him back 
into the race, producing one of the most fractured party conventions in history.  On 
the 53d ballot, Mexican War hero Winfield Scott won the Republican nomination for 
President.84  Scott would get trounced in the general election by a man almost 
universally considered to be a disaster as President, Franklin Pierce. 
The most notable event during Fillmore’s four months as a lame duck was his 
effort to fill a vacancy that had arisen on the Court after the Presidential election.  
Because the Democratic-controlled Senate wanted to preserve the vacancy for Pierce 
to fill, Fillmore faced stiff resistance.  In 1851, he had successfully nominated 
Benjamin Curtis, an eminent Whig lawyer, to the Court, and tried again in 1852 to 
find a Whig who would be agreeable to the Democrats in charge.  Since he was 
finding a replacement for John McKinley of Alabama who had died, he looked in 
vain for Southern Whigs whom the Democrats would accept.  They rejected his 
second nominee, George Badger, in spite of the fact he had been a Senator from 
                                                                
80Millard Fillmore, Special Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (Aug. 6, 
1850), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 10, 
at 67, 69 (1897). 
81See WILENTZ, supra note 6, at 590 (noting Massachusetts in 1843, Vermont in 1843, 
New Hampshire in 1846 and Pennsylvania in 1838). 
82See id. at 646-47. Fillmore assured one slave owner that his slaves would be 
apprehended if need be by sending in Federal troops.  Id. at 646.  Then, in 1851, Fillmore sent 
troops into Christiana, Pennsylvania to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act during an outburst of 
violence.  Id. at 647.  
83See id. at 647. 
84See SMITH, supra note 63, at 246.   
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North Carolina.  His third nomination was more notable:  He nominated then-
Louisiana Senator Judah Benjamin, making Fillmore the first President to nominate a 
Jew to the Court.  Since Benjamin had just been elected to the Senate, he was not 
eager to leave, and he turned down the appointment.  Eventually, the nomination fell 
to Pierce to make.  He acceded to the recommendation of the current members of the 
Court, including Justice Curtis, to nominate as McKinley’s replacement another 
Alabamian, the widely revered Supreme Court advocate, John Campbell.  Neither 
Curtis nor Campbell lasted long on the Court.  Curtis resigned in disgust over the 
Dred Scott decision, and Campbell resigned in support of the confederacy at the 
beginning of the Civil War in 1861.    
After leaving the Presidency, Fillmore pursued other opportunities for public 
service.  As one of the first ex-Presidents to devote his time to public service after 
leaving office, Fillmore became the first Chancellor of the University of Buffalo and 
the first President of the Buffalo Historical Society. 
IX. FRANKLIN PIERCE 
Franklin Pierce, a Democrat, was known as the second Young Hickory.  Whereas 
the first Young Hickory (Polk) had been both decisive and bold, Pierce was neither.  
One of his closest college friends at Bowdoin College was Nathaniel Hawthorne, 
who would later write his campaign biography.85  Some people consider it to be the 
worst fiction Hawthorne ever wrote. 
Pierce spent ten uneventful years in the Congress, the first four in the House and 
the last six in the Senate.  In all that time, he made no noteworthy speech and did not 
sponsor any important bills.  Instead, he was widely known for being the 
congressman least able to hold his liquor.86  Some might say he became qualified to 
run for the Presidency because he had avoided any firm stances on the great issues of 
the day.  In fact, Pierce became eligible because he was an Easterner who was 
sympathetic to slaveholders. 
When not in office, Pierce made a fortune as a lawyer.  He was especially adept 
at reading juries, a talent that helped him on the campaign trail as well.  Political 
connections enabled Pierce to serve in the Mexican War as a Brigadier General.87  
Although Pierce had led his men in the assault on Mexico City, he arrived too late.  
He was wounded when his horse stumbled and he fainted and fell off.   
Pierce became the standard bearer of the Democratic party in 1852 because his 
mediocrity and amiability appealed to the badly divided party.88  Any candidate with 
                                                                
85See LARRY GARA, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN PIERCE 35 (Donald R. McCoy et al. 
ed., 1991). 
86See id. at xi, xii, 31.  Pierce is so well known for his drinking habit that when the New 
Hampshire Legislature decided to provide $20,000 to save Pierce’s Concord home from urban 
development, they raised the funds by selling bourbon whisky in commemorative bottles.  Id. 
at xi-xii.  
87See id. at 30. 
88See id. at 23, 33, 41.  Though none of the leading contenders for the nomination could 
garner the necessary majority of votes, Pierce was still seen as a “man without claims or 
qualifications.”  Letter from Robert Toombs, Representative from Georgia, United States 
House of Representatives, to John J. Crittenden, Attorney General, United States of America 
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firm positions on issues was likely to be divisive, but Pierce had none.  He was the 
Northern man whom southerners could trust. 
Although there is little reason to have expected much from Pierce as President, 
his Presidency effectively ended before it began.  On the trip to the Capitol, his train 
derailed, and his 11-year old son was killed before his eyes.89  Neither he nor his 
wife recovered. 
As a former party boss in his state, Pierce knew how to conciliate, and the cabinet 
he put together was intended to be conciliatory.90  The problem is that it was too 
conciliatory: He left out the middle of his party; only the extremes from each party 
were represented, including Jefferson Davis, a West Point graduate, as his Secretary 
of War.  In the end, his patronage choices satisfied very few in his party and none 
outside of it.   
In his inaugural address, Pierce defended the constitutionality of slavery.  He 
declared that not only did the Constitution recognize slavery but that it was an 
“admitted right . . . . I fervently hope that the question [of slavery] is at rest . . . .”91  
He was wrong. 
The major accomplishment of the Pierce administration was the Kansas-
Nebraska bill.92  It repealed the Missouri Compromise barrier against western slavery 
and directed that territorial citizens could decide for themselves against slavery.  The 
Kansas-Nebraska bill was controversial in its own right, but Pierce did not enforce 
the law fairly.  Under his watch, freedom was never given a fair chance in Kansas.  
While anti-slavery forces forced their own government and pro-slavery groups 
forced theirs, and while pro-slavery forces used violence to extend their power, 
Pierce asserted in his annual Message to Congress that nothing had happened in 
Kansas “to justify the interposition of the Federal Executive.”93  Yet, it was clear by 
that time that the law had backfired.  In time, it would lead to the rise of the 
Republican Party, Bleeding Kansas, the collapse of the national Democratic Party, 
and the election of Abraham Lincoln.   
By the time Pierce decided to act, it was too late.  In late January 1856, he sent a 
special message to Congress about Bleeding Kansas.  He reviewed the territory’s 
history, characterized the actions of Free Staters as revolutionary, and declared, “[I]t 
is not the duty of the President of the United States to volunteer interposition by 
force to preserve the purity of elections either in a State or Territory.”94  Several days 
later, he issued a Proclamation ordering the Free Staters and the Border Ruffians to 
                                                          
(Dec. 5, 1852), quoted in ALLEN NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION 41 (1947), quoted in GARA, 
supra note 85, at 41.  
89GARA, supra note 85, at 32, 44. 
90See id. at 44. 
91Franklin Pierce, Inaugural Address, in THE PRESIDENTS SPEAK, supra note 18, at 118, 
125-26. 
92See generally GARA, supra note 85, at 88-96. 
93Franklin Pierce, Third Annual Message (Dec. 31, 1855), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 10, at 327, 340 (1897).  
94Franklin Pierce, Special Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (Jan. 24, 
1856), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 10, 
at 352, 358 (1897). 
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disperse under the threat of the local militia and federal troops.95  In March, Congress 
was confronted with rival measures: The Free States’ request for statehood and an 
administration bill permitting Kansas to hold a constitutional convention.  Congress 
split over the options.  As evidence of the election fraud of pro-slavery forces in 
Kansas mounted, and as Congress rejected any middle course, Senator Charles 
Sumner delivered a fiery speech in which he insulted the Slave Power, personified as 
he saw it by South Carolina Senator Andrew Butler.  Two days later, Sumner was 
badly beaten on the floor of the Senate by a cousin of Butler’s, Representative 
Preston Brooks.96  As the beating occurred, other Senators, including Stephen 
Douglas, watched in silence.  Finally, anti-slavery Whig Representative Ambrose 
Murray, who by happenstance was visiting the Senate that day, stopped Brooks 
before he killed Sumner.  It would take Sumner four years to recover enough from 
his injuries to return to work.  Two days after his beating, John Brown and his band 
murdered five proslavery settlers in Kansas.97  He was later apprehended by Army 
troops led by Robert E. Lee. 
Pierce’s constitutional stand continued to fuel tensions within the country.  When 
abolitionists recoiled against the imprisonment of an African-American based on 
what appeared to be trumped up charges, a race riot broke out in Boston in 1854, and 
Pierce reacted more fiercely than Fillmore had in the Thomas Sims case.98  Pierce 
ordered his Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, to send Marines, cavalry, and artillery 
to Boston, along with a federal revenue cutter that would await the inevitable order 
and return to slavery the African-American thought responsible for the rioting.  
Richard Henry Dana, Jr., led the defense for Anthony Burns, who was captured and 
incarcerated by federal troops. 
Yet another debacle for Pierce was the Ostend Manifesto.99 After Spanish 
authorities in Cuba seized an American vessel (the Black Warrior), he instructed his 
ministers in Spain, France, and England to devise a policy for Cuba.  The product 
was the Ostend Manifesto, a blunt statement that said that if Spain refused to sell the 
island to the United States, and if the United States believed Spain’s possession 
endangered “our internal peace and the existence of our Cherished Union,” the 
United States would be “justified in wresting it from Spain.”100  Intended to be secret, 
the document became public and aroused a stormy protest, particularly in the North. 
Not all that Pierce did was disastrous.  His most positive act as President was his 
successful negotiation to extend the United States’ territory to include 45,000 square 
miles purchased from Mexico for 10 million dollars. A more modest 
                                                                
95Franklin Pierce, A Proclamation (Feb. 11, 1856), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 10, at 390 (1897). 
96See GARA, supra note 85, at 121. 
97See id. at 122.   
98See generally WILENTZ, supra note 6, at 647-52.  In April 1851, hundreds of U.S. troops 
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100Id. 
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accomplishment is Pierce’s distinction as the only President whose name appears on 
the charter of a synagogue, an honor he earned when he signed into law a bill 
proclaiming that “all the rights, privileges and immunities heretofore granted by law 
to the Christian churches in the City of Washington, be, and the same are hereby 
extended to the Hebrew congregation of said city.”101  The law made possible the 
establishment of the first synagogue in the nation’s capitol.   
With no other apparent accomplishments and tensions within the party and the 
country mounting, Pierce had little, if any, realistic prospect for reelection.  He 
withdrew from contention for his party’s nomination after more than a dozen ballots 
at the convention indicated he had no chance to win.  The Democrats eventually 
nominated James Buchanan, Pierce’s Minister to Great Britain.  It was the first and 
only time in American history that a sitting President lost his party’s nomination to 
someone from within his own administration. 
X.  JAMES BUCHANAN 
For many people, James Buchanan is one of the few Presidents who could give 
Franklin Pierce a genuine contest as the all-time worst President.  Whereas Pierce’s 
hallmark had been to make a few, largely tragic errors in judgment, Buchanan’s fate 
was to make many. 
Buchanan’s public service prior to becoming President did not signal he would 
be a disaster as President.  To the contrary, over the course of forty years, he served 
as a member of the House, a United States Senator, Secretary of State, and Minister 
to Great Britain.102  Yet, in spite of these credentials, Buchanan was not a conciliator, 
nor someone prone to compromise.  He was that peculiar Eastern politician who, like 
Pierce, sympathized with slaveholders.  Buchanan blamed abolitionists for secession.  
Even after leaving the Presidency on the eve of the Civil War, he stubbornly held 
onto the belief that a few misguided Northerners were driving Southerners to leave 
the Union.103   
In his inaugural address, Buchanan vowed to oppose disunion.104  He undermined 
that pledge by appointing a cabinet that did not include any representatives from 
major factions of his party.  He remained stubbornly oblivious to the need for 
different views, relying mainly on the advice of friends and cronies, most of whom 
were Southerners.  Believing that Northerners were responsible for the pressure felt 
by Southerners to secede, his cabinet was overwhelmingly pro-slavery: In a cabinet 
of seven, four were Southerners, and one of the three Northerners was known for his 
pro-slavery views.105 
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Aware of the failure of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill to unify the country, Buchanan 
turned to the Supreme Court.  He believed the Court could take the heat off of the 
political branches from having to resolve conflicts over slavery.  Hence, he directly 
interfered with the Court as it was deciding Dred Scott.  As he walked to the podium 
at his inaugural, Buchanan stopped to chat briefly with Chief Justice Taney.  A few 
minutes later, Buchanan told the nation that a case pending before the Court would 
soon settle outstanding issues regarding slavery and the territories.  He urged 
everyone to submit “cheerfully” to the decision, “whatever [it] may be.”106  When the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott came down just two days later, it was widely 
suspected Taney had tipped off Buchanan.107 
In fact, the story is more disturbing.  In response to a letter from Buchanan, 
Justice Catron informed Buchanan that the five Southern justices would probably 
allow the lower court’s order to stand and avoid a broad ruling on the subject.  
Catron suggested that if Justice Robert Grier from Pennsylvania were to support their 
position, the Southerners might change their minds and directly dispose of the big 
constitutional questions posed in the case.  Buchanan wrote Grier a strong request 
that he join the Southerners.  Though Grier did just that, the Court’s decision did not 
settle the issue of territorial slavery, as Buchanan had hoped.  Instead, the decision 
thoroughly discredited the Taney Court among Republicans.  It persuaded them more 
than ever before that slavery and the powers protecting it had to be eradicated.  It 
was the beginning of the end for Buchanan. 
Buchanan strongly defended the decision.108  He believed the decision would not 
expand slavery, but he was wrong.  After a clear majority in Kansas had apparently 
rejected a pro-slavery constitution written by a small number of Kansans, Buchanan 
ignored the pleas of his own appointed Governor of Kansas and endorsed the 
constitution.  His efforts to support pro-slavery forces in Kansas subjected him to 
extensive criticism in Congress and elsewhere, particularly the North.109  Illinois’ 
Little Giant, Senator Stephen Douglas, tried in vain to keep it from being endorsed 
by the Congress.  A subsequent congressional investigation determined that the 
President’s efforts to bulldoze the Lecompton constitution through Congress had 
included several forms of bribery, through third parties, to members of Congress.110  
In response to the investigations, Buchanan sent two messages denying on 
constitutional grounds that the Congress had any authority over the executive branch.  
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The only exception, he said, occurred during impeachment proceedings before the 
Judiciary Committee.111  The House committee, however, was merely an 
investigating committee considering censure, not impeachment.  Buchanan also 
argued that, in the event of impeachment, his accusers would become his judges.112  
He noted that the executive and legislative branches were coordinate and had no 
authority to investigate each other.  He wrote, “I defy all investigation.  Nothing but 
the basest perjury can sully my good name.”113  The committee responded that there 
had been three earlier congressional investigations of corruption in the executive 
branch that had not risen to the level of impeachment, as the committee noted its 
findings did not.  Buchanan exulted in the fact that no criminal charges were 
proffered, but many people were shocked at the amount of graft permeating his 
administration.114 
Buchanan responded to Douglas’s lack of support by using every power he had to 
thwart Douglas’s reelection in 1858.115  Those efforts failed, as did any hopes 
Buchanan may have had of reelection.  Although he had vowed at the outset of his 
Presidency to serve but a single term, Buchanan privately resented the absence of 
any requests that he break his pledge.   
As his Presidency was ending, Buchanan faced the prospect of secession.  He 
argued that it was unconstitutional.116  He argued that the Framers had never intended 
any such right, and “[t]he solemn sanction of religion” had been added in the oaths 
of office by federal and state officials.117  But he suggested that it might be lawful if 
it were called a revolution instead of an inherent constitutional right.  Initially, 
Buchanan defended the secessionists and claimed that, based on his narrow reading 
of Presidential power, he had no authority to prevent it.  He rejected compromises 
fashioned in Congress.  He also refused either to surrender or to fortify Fort Sumter.  
Buchanan refused to negotiate, and his Secretary of War, Lewis Cass, resigned after 
Buchanan refused to send additional men to the forts under siege.  With his cabinet 
and administration falling apart, Buchanan replaced departing secretaries with less 
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pro-southern cabinet officers, such as Ohio’s Edwin Stanton, whom he appointed 
Attorney General.   
After South Carolina formally seceded in early December 1860, Buchanan 
delivered his annual message, in which he denied that it had the constitutional right 
to secede.118  At the same time, Buchanan extended an encouraging olive branch to 
seceding states in his denial of federal authority over their actions.  They could go in 
peace, because neither he as President nor the Congress had the authority to declare 
and make war on them.  He figured that the power to coerce a state could not be 
found among the enumerated powers of the federal government.  “It is,” he argued, 
“equally apparent that its exercise is not ‘necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution’ any one of these powers.”119  For two months after Lincoln’s election, he 
did nothing.  He surrounded himself with Southerners and had nothing to do with 
Republican leaders.  All he did was to tell Major Anderson, who was in charge of 
Fort Sumter, that it would be treason for him to abandon his post.  He also authorized 
the commander to move his troops to the most defensible position, though he denied 
he had done this to his Southern friends.  His friend and Secretary of State, Jeremiah 
Black, threatened to leave the cabinet unless Buchanan took a more forceful stand 
against the secessionists.  He then finally took the path back toward Unionism.  He 
supported what General Scott and most of his cabinet had been demanding for 
weeks—the reinforcement Fort Sumter.  Anderson thus had enough of a force to 
defend the fort for at least a little while.  On the day of Lincoln’s inauguration, 
Buchanan had received a message from Anderson that he needed more men.120  
Happily for Buchanan, this was now Lincoln’s problem. 
A Senate resolution to condemn Buchanan failed but received wide publicity.121  
Northern newspapers roundly condemned Buchanan’s inaction in the face of direct 
threats to federal property.122  Five members of Buchanan’s cabinet joined Lincoln’s 
administration and never bothered to defend Buchanan publicly.123  Buchanan’s 
portrait was removed from the Capitol rotunda to keep it from being defaced.124  
Buchanan spent the remainder of his life defending his actions.  In his memoirs, he 
blamed the Civil War primarily on Northern radicalism.125  
XI. RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 
Rutherford B. Hayes was the second of five Civil War officers elected President.  
Not long after volunteering for military service in the Civil War, Hayes became a 
Major in the Ohio infantry.  He served four years, was wounded five times, and was 
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breveted Major General.  Immediately after the war, he began a successful political 
career upon his election to the House of Representatives.  Subsequently, he was 
elected to three successive terms as Governor of Ohio.  In his third term, the 
Republican convention was held in Cincinnati, and Hayes was chosen as his party’s 
nominee on the seventh ballot based on his military service and history as a 
reformer.126 
Hayes is remembered primarily for winning the controversial election of 1876.127  
The Democratic candidate, Samuel Tilden, had won the popular vote but lacked a 
majority in the Electoral College.  Pursuant to the Twelfth Amendment, the matter 
went to the House, which appointed a special 13-member commission to resolve 
disputed electoral votes.  When David Davis, then a Supreme Court justice, decided 
not to serve on the commission in order to remain a viable candidate to be a Senator 
from Illinois, another Republican, Justice Joseph Bradley, was appointed to the 
Commission.  The membership was then seven Republicans and six Democrats.  
Tilden remained aloof and silent during the commission’s deliberations, while 
Hayes, with the help of his friend and personal lawyer Stanley Matthews, lobbied the 
commission behind the scenes.  Hayes helped to broker a deal by promising to serve 
only a single term and to end Reconstruction.  The commission eventually voted 7-6 
in favor of Hayes on each contested elector.  Tilden took the decision 
magnanimously, promising to support Hayes and calling upon Democrats to do the 
same.  Over the course of Hayes’s Presidency, Tilden faded into political 
obscurity.128 
Hayes achieved more than a few constitutional legacies.  First, he successfully 
battled Congress for primacy over federal appointments.129  He set the tone with his 
cabinet.  He had left out of the mix Republican Stalwarts, including New York’s 
Roscoe Conkling and Maine’s James Blaine.  Only the certainty that Democrats 
would supply the necessary votes (because he included Democrats in the cabinet) 
made their confirmation possible. 
Hayes’s interest in appointments extended to civil service reform.  He had 
adopted civil service reform as a priority in response to the large number of 
corruption scandals in the preceding administration.  Using his executive power, he 
issued an order in June 1877 prohibiting federal employees from taking part in 
political activity.130  This directive exacerbated the already troublesome fracturing of 
the Republican party, particularly the Stalwarts led by the charismatic, 
temperamental Senator from New York, Roscoe Conkling, whose power largely 
emanated from his control of lucrative patronage appointments in the Port of New 
York.  At this point, Conkling was in his heyday.  He was a colorful speaker and 
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character who had declined President Grant’s offer of the Chief Justiceship in order 
to make money and cultivate his chances to become President. 
Hayes’s interest in civil service reform led to his ordering an investigation into 
the New York Custom House that Conkling had controlled through his lieutenant, 
Chester Arthur, for years.  When the investigation revealed vast corruption among 
Conkling’s men (including Arthur) at the New York Custom House, Hayes sent fresh 
nominations to the Senate, including Theodore Roosevelt, Sr. Following the custom 
of senatorial courtesy (deferring to senators on appointments made in their respective 
states), the Senate deferred to Conkling.  Hayes vowed to defend the executive 
prerogative of the President and not to “give up the contest.”131  Once the 
congressional session ended, Hayes suspended the incumbents and used recess 
appointments to replace them with men of merit.  When Congress reconvened, 
thirteen Republicans joined with twenty Democrats to sustain Hayes’s actions.  The 
President, thus, took a big step to restore the executive independence he regarded as 
having been squandered during the administrations of Andrew Johnson and Ulysses 
Grant.  
Soon after Hayes became President, the nation’s four largest railroads agreed to 
raise rates and lower wages by ten percent.  This pay cut, the second major reduction 
since the depression began in 1873, led to the July 1877 Great Uprising, during 
which striking workers shut down most of the country’s rail service.132  As fighting 
between strikers and state militiamen intensified, Hayes sent federal troops to restore 
order in West Virginia and Pennsylvania.  These orders made Hayes the first 
President since Jackson to use federal troops in a labor dispute. 
One of Hayes’s most important legacies is his formally ordering the repeal of 
Reconstruction.  To mollify Tilden’s supporters after he had been declared the 
winner of the 1876 election, Hayes agreed to end the military occupation of the 
South, to support genuine reconstruction of education and transportation in the 
South, and to bring at least one southern Democrat into his cabinet. 
One thing that Hayes did not want to do was to withdraw protection for blacks 
trying to vote in Southern elections.  The tactic favored by Democrats for 
withdrawing the protection was attaching riders to unrelated appropriation bills.  On 
April 29, 1879, Hayes vetoed an appropriations measure carrying such a rider.  
Democrats responded with a rider on another bill, and Hayes vetoed it.  In all, 
Congress passed seven such bills, and Hayes vetoed them all.133 
Meanwhile, animosity towards Chinese immigrants in the West led Congress to 
pass a bill, contrary to an 1868 treaty, restricting Chinese immigration.  Hayes, who 
had championed black suffrage, vetoed this as well.  Though he remarked with regret 
that the American experience on race had not up until then been “encouraging,” he 
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ordered his Secretary of State to negotiate a new treaty with China that restricted (but 
did not ban) future immigration.134 
Hayes’s Presidency ended on a note of defeat.  The Senate, in what may have 
been the first filibuster on a judicial nomination, refused to allow a vote on the 
nomination of his friend, Stanley Matthews, to the Supreme Court.  As a senator 
from Ohio, Matthews expected to be approved because of senatorial courtesy; but 
labor unions, Democrats, and Republican Stalwarts like Conkling opposed the 
nomination.135  It smacked of cronyism given that Matthews had been a long-time 
adviser to the President (including during the 1876 election dispute). 
XII. JAMES A. GARFIELD 
James Garfield was the third Ohioan, Civil War veteran, and Republican in a row 
elected President in this era.  Garfield was the first dark horse chosen by the 
Republicans.136  He was nominated on the 36th ballot in the Republican convention, 
still the longest in history.  His nomination was awkward from the outset, because he 
had come to the convention to promote the nomination of his friend and fellow 
Ohioan, John Sherman. 
As the party’s nominee, Garfield tried in vain to broker unity among competing 
Republican factions.  Over Conkling’s objection, his lieutenant Chester Arthur 
accepted the party’s nomination as Vice-President.137  A subsequent meeting with 
Conkling did not smooth things over.  Garfield, as a candidate, had made the mistake 
of arousing expectations of patronage (especially in Conkling) greater than he 
wished to fulfill.  He complicated matters by choosing James Blaine as his Secretary 
of State, who was a bitter enemy of Conkling.   
The principal focus of Garfield’s shortened Presidency was appointments.138  
Three weeks into office, Garfield allowed Blaine to persuade him to nominate a 
Blaine lieutenant as collector of the Port of New York, the chief patronage plum in 
the country (since it was responsible for almost a third of the money coming into the 
federal treasury).  Charging that the nomination violated senatorial courtesy, 
Conkling urged his fellow senators to reject the nomination.  Garfied refused to 
withdraw the nomination.  After several months in which Conkling had managed to 
stall the nomination through a filibuster, Blaine outsmarted Conkling.  Conkling’s 
filibuster was working: It stalled not only the nomination to head the Custom House, 
but other pending nominations as well.  Garfield was anxious to get his government 
in place, and turned to Blaine for counsel.  Blaine hit upon a brilliant move to break 
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the stalemate.  The day arrived when, in the course of the debate over the 
nomination, a note came to the Presiding Officer in the Senate, Chester Arthur, who 
was well known as Conkling’s creature.  Arthur turned white when he read it and 
gestured for Conkling, then on the floor, to see it.  When Conkling saw it, he, too, 
paled.  Arthur then read the note directing that the President had withdrawn all 
nominations but the one for the head of the Custom House.  Now it became 
impossible to hide what was at stake and to keep the Senate bottled up over a single 
problematic nomination.  Blaine had outmaneuvered Conkling. 
Facing defeat, Conkling tried something dramatic–he resigned from the Senate 
and urged his fellow New York Senator, Thomas Platt, to resign as well.  Conkling 
figured the state legislature would send him back to the Senate, but it did not.  
Garfield had won, and Conkling never returned to the Senate. 
This was not Garfield’s only victory in the appointments process.  Shortly after 
becoming President, Garfield re-nominated Stanley Matthews to the Supreme 
Court.139  When Matthews had been nominated to the Court a year earlier by Hayes, 
the Senate had failed to act on the nomination, which never made it out of 
committee.  In spite of his having been a Senator, Matthews had faced opposition 
from within his own party and from some Democrats.  With Garfield in office, the 
objection to Matthews as a crony of the President faded away.  And with Conkling 
out of the Senate, Garfield was able to exert more control over his party’s caucus.  
Eventually the nomination went to the floor of the Senate, where it passed by the 
closest margin ever for a Supreme Court nomination—a single vote.   
On the last day of June 1881, Garfield made another historic appointment—the 
first Jew as Council General to Egypt, Simon Wolf.  The next day, a mentally 
disturbed and disgruntled office seeker fatally shot the President.   
XIII. CHESTER A. ARTHUR 
It’s hard to imagine anyone less likely than Chester Arthur to become President.  
His highest office before becoming Vice-President was head of the New York 
Custom House.  Indeed, he surprised most people by taking the Vice-Presidency.  
When it became clear the Republican convention had picked Arthur as Vice-
President, Arthur sought the approval of his mentor, Roscoe Conkling.  Amazingly, 
when the two met at the convention, they did not notice a reporter hiding in the 
corner.140  Conkling asked Arthur not to take the position, but Arthur refused.  He 
said that it was undoubtedly the greatest honor he could ever conceive receiving, and 
the two parted on less than friendly terms.  Their friendship would never be the 
same. 
Once Arthur became President, he met again with his former mentor and friend, 
Conkling.  He told Conkling in no uncertain terms that he intended to be President in 
his own right and that he would not be beholden to him or any other special interests.  
Thus, he refused to do Conkling’s bidding to remove the person Garfield had 
appointed to head the New York Custom House.141  Arthur tried to mend fences by 
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nominating Conkling to the Supreme Court, but Conkling refused even after the 
Senate had confirmed the nomination.142  
Arthur went on to make two first-rate appointments to the Supreme Court: 
Horace Gray and Samuel Blatchford.143  Gray had been actively involved in the anti-
slavery movement since he graduated from Harvard at 17, and he even wrote a 
blistering critique of the Dred Scott opinion in 1857 (when he was 29).  Gray was 
appointed to Massachusetts’s highest court in 1864, and served as its Chief Justice. 
He was widely regarded as one of the nation’s leading jurists at the time of his 
appointment to the Supreme Court.  Blatchford had nearly as good a reputation:  At 
the time of his appointment to the Court, Blatchford was known nationally as an 
excellent judge with fifteen years of experience—five as a Federal District Judge in 
New York and ten on the U.S. Court of Appeals.   
Perhaps Arthur’s greatest accomplishment was to sign into law the Pendleton 
Civil Service Reform Act, by far the most ambitious civil service reform enacted to 
that time.144  In the immediate aftermath of Garfield’s assassination by a deluded 
office-seeker, the public support for civil service reform mounted.  Arthur took 
advantage of it to do what he regarded as the right thing, in spite of previous decades 
as a beneficiary and dispenser of patronage.     
On at least one other issue, Arthur made his mark.  He tried, largely in vain, to 
keep Congress from outlawing Chinese immigration.  His veto of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act forced Congress to reduce its ban from twenty to ten years (in order to 
win enough votes to avoid an override).145  
XIV.  GROVER CLEVELAND 
Grover Cleveland has several distinctions as President: First, he is the only 
President to serve for two, non-consecutive terms.  He is the 22d and 24th President 
of the United States.  Second, he is the only Democrat elected President during the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century.  Third, he had a majority of votes in all three 
Presidential contests in which he was a candidate.146  Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Andrew Jackson are the only other Presidents who can make similar or superior 
claims.  Fourth, Cleveland has the distinction of having won a Presidential contest by 
one of the smallest popular margins in history, about 30,000 votes in 1884.147  It was 
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actually closer than that: The person who won New York in 1884 was going to be 
President, and Cleveland carried his home state over James Blaine by less than 1200 
votes.  A shift of 600 votes would have made Blaine President. 
Pressured during the campaign to extend civil service reform, Cleveland spent 
considerable time going over the records of applicants and weighing the merits of 
candidates for both major and minor posts.  He promised not to remove Republicans 
except for cause, but battled the Senate for control over executive appointments.148  
At one time, the Senate stalled several hundred of his nominations in response to his 
efforts to consolidate executive control of appointments to the executive branch and 
to the courts.   
One of Cleveland’s most significant successes in battling the Senate for control 
over the appointments process involved Supreme Court nominations.  In 1893, New 
York Senator David Hill had blocked Cleveland’s nominations of two New Yorkers 
to the Court.149  In response, Cleveland did an end run around Hill.  He refused to 
nominate a third New Yorker to fill the vacancy then on the Court, and instead 
decided to nominate Senator Edward Douglass White from Louisiana to the Court.  
The nomination went through without a hitch because of senators’ traditional 
willingness to defer to their colleagues’ nominations.  When Cleveland had another 
vacancy, he nominated a New Yorker and, thus, broke the hold of regions over 
particular seats on the Court. 
Cleveland oversaw the enactment of several landmark pieces of legislation,150 
including the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887; the Dawes Severalty Act, which 
invested Indians with American citizenship; and a law elevating the Department of 
Agriculture to cabinet status.  Although he contributed little of substance to these 
laws, they are among the most enduring laws enacted by the Congress. 
Because Cleveland believed campaigning was beneath his dignity, he did not 
actively campaign in 1888, while Benjamin Harrison gave more than a hundred 
campaign speeches.  Harrison won in the Electoral College, though he lost the 
popular vote to Cleveland.151  Later, this contest would be singled out for its 
distinction as the last time before the Presidential election of 2000 in which the 
winner won the electoral vote but lost the popular vote.   
In 1892, Cleveland ran against Harrison for the third time and won.  In his second 
term, Cleveland became famous for his mishandling of the Pullman strike in 1894.152  
That strike would not have been of concern to the federal government but for the fact 
that the American Railway Union, responding to the strikers’ appeal, refused to 
move trains carrying Pullman cars.  Soon rail traffic west of Chicago became 
paralyzed.  Cleveland asked his Attorney General, Richard Olney, to handle the 
matter.  Olney, a former railroad lawyer, did.  After consulting with railroad 
management, he sought and obtained an injunction from a federal court forbidding 
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the strikers from interfering with the movement of the mail.  But the strike 
continued.  Olney arranged for army units to be sent to Chicago to enforce the 
injunction.  Cleveland then ordered the troops into the city to preserve order.  The 
governor of Illinois, John Peter Altgeld, a friend of a feisty lawyer named Clarence 
Darrow, resented Cleveland’s order.  He believed local and state authorities could 
handle the problem and sent a telegram to Cleveland denying his right to use troops 
without the Governor’s consent.  Cleveland’s response was categorical: “I have 
neither transcended my authority nor duty . . . [. I]n this hour of danger and public 
distress, discussion may well give way to active efforts on the part of all in authority 
to restore obedience to the law and to protect life and property.”153  Altgeld then 
threw all of his influence against the administration.  The strike was broken after the 
strike’s leader, Eugene Debs, ignored the injunction.  The Supreme Court upheld 
Cleveland’s executive action.154  Cleveland’s last act as President was to veto a bill 
excluding immigrants who could not read and write at least one language.   
Cleveland left a few enduring marks on the Presidency aside from successfully 
reducing the extent of Senate and regional control over Supreme Court appointments 
and appointments in the executive branch.  He is second only to Franklin Roosevelt 
for the most vetoes cast by a President.155  Taken together, his predecessors vetoed a 
total of 205 bills, while Cleveland vetoed 414 bills in his first term alone.  He 
succeeded in terminating the Tenure in Office Act, which had served as the basis for 
Johnson’s impeachment and been a problem for Presidents ever since.156  Cleveland 
also strengthened the Presidency during the 1885 border dispute between Venezuela 
and the British colony of Guiana when he personally supervised negotiations for a 
settlement with Great Britain.157  Interestingly, before Cleveland’s Presidency, then-
political scientist Woodrow Wilson was convinced that congressional supremacy 
was the critical dynamic in the American system.  After Cleveland’s two terms, 
Wilson changed his mind.  He praised Cleveland as the only President between 1865 
and 1898 who “played a leading and decisive part in the quiet drama of our national 
life.”158 
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XV.  BENJAMIN HARRISON 
Benjamin Harrison was the last Civil War General to serve as President, but he 
was the first and to date the only grandson of a President (William Henry Harrison) 
to become President in his own right.  In fact, he took the oath of office 48 years to 
the day after his grandfather had become President. 
Benjamin Harrison graduated from Miami University in Ohio and studied law in 
Cincinnati.  He then made the decision to commence his practice of law in 
Indianapolis.  Because he was a war hero, he was constantly approached to run for 
office.  For awhile he turned down the requests so he could build a lucrative law 
practice.  He became a national symbol of Republican loyalty when, at the request of 
President Grant, he defended Union generals in a civil action arising out of the 
Supreme Court’s 1866 decision in Ex Parte Milligan.159  As that decision established, 
Lambin Milligan, a civilian, had been illegally tried and imprisoned by a military 
court, and now Milligan was suing for damages.  Harrison’s job was to limit them to 
the smallest amount possible.  When the jury returned with a five-dollar reward, 
Harrison became an instant favorite of the Republican faithful.  
Harrison turned down an offer to serve in Garfield’s cabinet in order to serve as a 
United States Senator.160  In the Senate, Harrison persistently attacked Cleveland’s 
vetoes of veterans’ pension bills.  His popularity with veterans was to be a major 
factor in his election as President in 1888.161  But Harrison lost his reelection bid to 
the Senate when the state’s Democratically controlled legislature rejected his 
retention in office by a single vote.   
Harrison was inaugurated in a rainstorm with Grover Cleveland holding an 
umbrella over his head while he read his inaugural address.  The inaugural is 
distinctive for his call to end any special treatment of the South in civil rights or any 
other laws, his call that African-Americans be given the right to vote, and his lament 
at the proliferation of monopolies and trusts.162 
Harrison put together a very competent and experienced cabinet, but at a cost: 
None of the eight cabinet secretaries had worked actively for his nomination, and 
their selection did not serve the traditional function of placating important party 
factions to build consensus for future policy.163 
Harrison’s appointments caused him trouble in another way.  His Postmaster 
General removed half of the postmasters.164  Unlike Cleveland, Harrison removed 
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many officials before they had completed their four-year terms of office.  Nor did his 
appointments placate congressional leaders from his own party.  Harrison’s penchant 
for appointing newspaper editors and publishers to diplomatic and other posts 
angered Senators who were aggrieved by some past journalistic expose or story.165  
And so the Senate, for example, rejected Harrison’s nominee for ambassador to 
Germany, the distinguished Cincinnati editor Murat Halstead.166  It was Harrison’s 
first, but not last, defeat from his own party. 
While Harrison spent considerable time at informal White House dinners with 
congressional leaders or other members of Congress whose support he needed, it did 
not help.  He was hampered by divisions within his party over patronage 
appointments.167  In the Senate, where Republicans had only a bare majority, a 
“silver bloc” of sixteen senators held the balance of power.168  He needed their 
support to implement his party’s platform, including civil rights for African-
Americans.  Things got worse after the mid-term elections, in which Republicans got 
hammered in both House and Senate races.   
Congress hampered Harrison more than it helped.  The only major piece of 
legislation enacted during Harrison’s administration was the Sherman Anti-trust Act, 
though his Justice Department refused to enforce it.  This might help to explain the 
antipathy towards Harrison expressed by a later Republican President who 
vigorously enforced the act.  Teddy Roosevelt described Harrison as “a cold-
blooded, narrow-minded, prejudiced, obstinate, timid old psalm-singing Indianapolis 
politician.”169  Contrary to this description, Harrison publicly protested the treatment 
of Jews in Czarist Russia in his Annual Message to Congress of December 9, 1891.   
The election of 1892 was distinctive as the only Presidential contest in which the 
nominees from both parties had served as President.  With his wife dying, Harrison 
devoted little attention to the race.  Cleveland refused to campaign out of respect for 
Mrs. Harrison, who died in the middle of the contest.  Thus, the race became 
distinctive as the last presidential contest in which neither of the major candidates 
campaigned.   
XVI. WILLIAM MCKINLEY 
The next President from Ohio, William McKinley, had the distinction of being 
the last Civil War veteran elected President.  During the war, he had served on the 
staff of Major Rutherford B. Hayes, who supported McKinley’s rise in Ohio 
politics.170  (Ohio was home to six of the seven Republican Presidents elected 
between 1876 and 1920.)171  McKinley distinguished himself as a champion of the 
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most powerful theme of the late nineteenth century Republican party—American 
nationalism.  His major initiative in his first term was not to wave the “bloody shirt” 
of the Civil War or inveigh against Catholics, immigrants, and people who consumed 
alcohol.172  He defended high tariffs as providing critical protection for America’s 
workingmen.  The tariff issue helped to bind farmers and the rising middle class.  
The outcome in his re-election campaign in 1900 was the largest Republican victory 
since Grant’s in 1872. 
The Spanish-American War helped to redefine the Presidency.173  The White 
House clerical staff grew from six to eighty people to keep up with the paperwork.  
The President backed off protectionist policies to maintain support from around the 
world.  In 1898, McKinley requested and received a Declaration of War against 
Spain.  The declaration was made in response to the explosion of an American ship 
in the Havana harbor.  It sank with a loss of 266 lives.  The ship had been sent to 
reduce tensions with Spain, which Americans and others believed was trying to crush 
rebellion in Cuba against Spanish domination.  Based on a report that the cause of 
the explosion was external (with Spanish agents possibly the cause), McKinley tried 
to avoid war with requests to arbitrate, but they did not work.  McKinley eventually 
signed a treaty providing that Cuba should become independent and that Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the Philippines should be ceded to the United States.  The Americans also 
took control over Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.  The Senate eventually ratified the 
treaty by a margin of one vote.174 
What followed was extensive involvement of the McKinley administration with 
the governance of territories outside the continental United States.175  One of 
McKinley’s most prominent actions was appointing William Howard Taft to lead the 
transition from military to civilian government in the Philippines.  Taft turned down 
McKinley’s offer to appoint him to the Supreme Court in order to finish the job.  
One of McKinley’s most important decisions came in 1900 when he chose a 
running mate (his first Vice-President had died in office).176  Over the objection of 
his political adviser, Mark Hanna, McKinley chose Teddy Roosevelt, who had 
become Governor of New York based on his popularity as a leader of the Rough 
Riders in the Spanish-American War.  Hanna was not happy with the choice of 
Roosevelt, because “only ‘one heartbeat’ would separate ‘that damned cowboy’ from 
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the White House.”177  After McKinley easily won his party’s nomination to run again 
for the Presidency, Hanna warned McKinley, “[Y]our duty . . . is to live for four 
years from next March.”178 
Immediately after his second inauguration, McKinley took an extensive tour of 
the western States.  He planned to return to the White House after delivering an 
address at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo on September 5.  The speech was 
his last.  He was fatally wounded when an anarchist, who had come to the exhibition 
for the sole purpose of killing McKinley, shot him twice.179 
XVII.  WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 
William Howard Taft never wanted to be President.  His life’s ambition was to be 
a judge, preferably on the Supreme Court.180  But his wife wanted him to be 
President, and Taft did what he could to please her.  He accepted a series of 
important political appointments, culminating in his serving as Teddy Roosevelt’s 
Secretary of War and Roosevelt’s self-appointed successor. 
While Teddy Roosevelt wanted to make the Presidency the most important 
branch and interpreted its powers broadly, Taft narrowly construed its powers.  Taft 
wanted to keep the branches in equilibrium and limit government in order to give 
personal and property rights free rein.  He declared that he would not act unless he 
found the power to do so in the Constitution or in a law and believed “[t]here is no 
undefined residuum of power which [a President] can exercise because it seems to 
him to be in the public interest.”181  In contrast, Roosevelt believed a President was 
empowered to act unless the Constitution clearly barred him from acting.  These 
differences did not bode well for their future relationship. 
As President, Taft, did not use government as an agency to relieve the misery of 
the masses.  He never intervened to settle a labor strike.  He relied upon southern 
whites to solve the problems African-Americans were experiencing, and he opposed 
women’s suffrage.   
Yet, Taft implemented a number of reforms to make government more efficient.  
He persuaded Congress to enact an income tax to raise revenue, sought reform of the 
tariff and the banking systems, tried to exert greater control than did Roosevelt over 
big business in order to improve competition, and oversaw an expansion of 
conservation of natural resources.182 
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In addition to their contrary conceptions of the Presidency, the split with 
Roosevelt turned on several different issues.  The first was Taft’s failure to keep 
Roosevelt’s cabinet intact.183  Of Taft’s nine cabinet secretaries, seven studied law, 
five were corporate lawyers, none was a progressive reformer, and only three had 
served Roosevelt.  In a major scandal, a Teddy Roosevelt loyalist, Gifford Pinchot, 
the nation’s chief forester, charged the Interior Secretary Richard Ballinger with 
improperly disposing of some Alaskan coal fields.  Taft responded to Pinchot’s 
insubordination (Ballinger was his superior) by firing Pinchot.184 
By June 1910, differences over reform widened the division between Taft and 
Roosevelt.185  Taft was enacting more reforms in four years than Roosevelt had in 
seven.  Taft’s reforms included more power for the Tariff Commission, a limit on the 
use of labor injunctions, a post-savings bank, the parcel post, federal budget systems 
(including elaborate plans for a balanced budget), streamlining the postal office to 
put it on a pay as you go basis, and creating the United States Court of Commerce.  
Congress rejected his budget plans, leaving the United States then as the only 
important nation in the world without a federal budget. 
The final break between Taft and Roosevelt occurred in 1911, when 
Attorney General George W. Wickersham filed an antitrust suit against 
U.S. Steel.  The Taft administration had already filed successful suits 
against American Tobacco and Standard Oil, but the suit against U.S. 
Steel was different because Roosevelt had personally consented (in 1907) 
to the trust’s formation.  Therefore, the suit implied that [Roosevelt] had 
approved an illegal monopoly.186 
Taft eventually lost the Presidency in a three-way race in 1912.  For a President 
who believed he only had the powers expressly given to him by the Constitution, 
Taft had a surprising number of accomplishments.  These included the first tariff 
revision since 1897, the placing of conservation on a legal basis, improvement of 
railroad regulation, an antitrust crusade, the building of most of the Panama Canal, 
adding two new amendments to the Constitution, developing a responsible federal 
budget, and peacefully settling several international disputes.   
Taft’s most bittersweet accomplishment was making six appointments to the 
Supreme Court—the most ever made by a President in a single term.  Taft took these 
and other judicial appointments quite seriously.  He put a premium on a nominee’s 
commitment to protecting private property rights and narrowly construing 
congressional powers.  When Taft offered the chief justiceship to then-Justice 
Edward Douglass White, Taft lamented that he was offering White the one job he 
coveted the most.187  Nine years later, Taft would realize his life’s dream to become 
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Chief Justice of the United States after lobbying the next Ohioan elected to the 
Presidency, Warren Harding. 
XVIII.  WARREN G. HARDING 
Warren Harding was the eighth and, to date, the last Ohioan elected President.  
His opponent in the 1920 Presidential election was Ohio Governor James Cox, so the 
winner was guaranteed to be a man from Ohio.  Harding is the only Senator, besides 
Jack Kennedy, to have been elected President directly from the Senate during the 
20th century.   
Harding campaigned as the opposite of Woodrow Wilson.  Wilson was patrician, 
and Harding was not.  Wilson was a public intellectual and arrogant, and Harding 
was neither.  Wilson was progressive, and Harding was not.  Harding won the 
election by what was then the largest popular majority in American Presidential 
history.   
Most of what people know about Harding are the scandals that consumed his 
Presidency.188  Yet, these do not tell the full story of his shortened Presidency.  He 
made a number of excellent appointments to his cabinet,189 including Charles Evans 
Hughes as Secretary of State and Herbert Hoover as Commerce Secretary.  But, not 
all of his appointments worked out as intended.  His appointment of his campaign 
manager, Henry Daughery, as Attorney General was a disaster that would eventually 
damage Harding’s legacy.   
Harding took Supreme Court appointments no less seriously than Taft did.  After 
securing Harding’s nomination as Chief Justice, Taft advised Harding on his three 
other appointments, including Senator George Sutherland as an Associate Justice.190  
Harding also allowed Taft, as Chief Justice, to provide consistent counsel on 
appointments that he made both to the Supreme Court and to the lower courts.191  
Harding ducked the League of Nations controversy, which had consumed 
Wilson; but he gave qualified support to United States’ entry into the World Court.192  
He supported Hughes’s plan for international naval disarmament.193  On the domestic 
front, he persuaded Congress to adopt unified federal budget-making.194  On a 
personal and humane note, he surprised many people when he pardoned Eugene 
                                                                
188See, e.g, Robert K. Murray, Warren G. Harding, in THE PRESIDENTS: A REFERENCE 
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 465, 476-77 (expounding on the Veterans Bureau Scandal, Teapot 
Dome Scandal, the Alien Property Custodial Scandal, and the posthumous effect on Harding’s 
reputation); see also ROBERT H. FERRELL, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: FROM WOODROW 
WILSON TO HARRY S. TRUMAN 25-63 (2006). 
189See Morton Keller, Warren G. Harding, in “TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY”: THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS, supra note 133, at 206, 208 (“[Harding] filled his cabinet with some 
of the best minds of the day: Charles Evans Hughes at State, Herbert Hoover at Commerce, 
Henry C. Wallace . . . at Agriculture, and, more questionably, Andrew Mellon at Treasury.”). 
190See ABRAHAM, supra note 139, at 186-87.   
191See JOHN W. DEAN, WARREN G. HARDING 122 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 2004). 
192
 See ROBERT K. MURRAY, THE HARDING ERA 368-73 (1969). 
193Id. at 152-53.  
194Id. at 173-74. 
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
506 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:467 
Debs, the Socialist Party leader who had been imprisoned under the 1917 Espionage 
Act for opposing American involvement in World War I.  Upon his release from 
prison, Debs accepted Harding’s invitation to visit him at the White House.195 
Harding died shortly after being informed of impending scandals in his 
administration.  His death has left unanswered the extent of his responsibility for the 
scandals that became the first piece of business for his successor, Calvin Coolidge. 
XIX.  CALVIN COOLIDGE 
Calvin Coolidge may be most famous for his wry sense of humor and for his 
general reticence.  In one exchange, a woman sitting next to him at a state dinner 
said, “‘I made a bet today that I could get more than two words out of you.’  ‘You 
lose,’” he responded.196  A biting and memorable remark made about him came from 
Dorothy Parker, who said, upon being told Coolidge had died, “‘How can they 
tell?’”197 
For a man of few words, Coolidge tried to do a lot for both Presidential power 
and the Constitution.  He continued Harding’s practice of regular press 
conferences.198  Perhaps his greatest achievement was his handling of the Teapot 
Dome scandal he had inherited from Harding.199  Senate investigations indicated that 
oil magnates had bribed the Interior Secretary, Albert Fall, in order to gain leasing 
rights to the government’s Teapot Dome oil reserve in Wyoming and the Elk Hills 
Reserve in California.  Almost immediately upon taking office, Coolidge appointed 
two individuals as special counsel, one a Democrat, Atlee Pomerene, and the other a 
Republican named Owen Roberts.  His timing was impeccable, because the Senate 
was on the verge of taking more extreme action.  The appointees were perfect, for 
they had all the professional experience necessary to conduct a responsible, fair, and 
thorough investigation.  It would also meet Coolidge’s clear directive to let the chips 
fall where they may.   
In 1925, Coolidge nominated then-Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone to the 
Supreme Court.200  Coolidge had replaced Daugherty with Stone, whom he had 
known since they were classmates at Amherst College.  As Attorney General, Stone 
had won nearly universal respect for restoring integrity to the Justice Department.  
Nevertheless, he became the first Court nominee to personally appear before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to respond to complaints leveled against him for 
allowing an investigation and prosecution of a Montana Senator.  Stone deftly 
answered the questions and was swiftly and overwhelmingly confirmed. 
                                                                
195See DEAN, supra note 191, at 128.   
196PAUL F. BOLLER, JR., PRESIDENTIAL ANECDOTES 241 (rev. ed. 1996) (1981). 
197Id. at 235.   
198See ROBERT SOBEL, COOLIDGE: AN AMERICAN ENIGMA 239 (1998) (“[Coolidge] met 
with the press, telling the reporters he intended to continue Harding’s practice of twice weekly 
press conferences.”). 
199See ROBERT H. FERRELL, THE PRESIDENCY OF CALVIN COOLIDGE 43-48 (Homer E. 
Socolofsky ed., 1998). 
200See id. at 79. 
40https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/3
2006] FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS 507 
Coolidge’s calm under fire helped him win the Presidency in his own right in 
1924.  In fact, he entered his second term with a larger majority in Congress than he 
had inherited.   
In spite of his popularity and his party’s control of Congress, Coolidge ran into 
trouble early in his second term.  The Senate rejected his nomination of Charles 
Beecher Warren to become Attorney General (to replace Stone).201  Warren’s 
rejection was the first time in the 20th century that the Senate had rejected a cabinet 
nominee.  Indeed, it was the first time since 1868.  But Coolidge re-nominated him.  
Again, the Senate rejected him.  When Coolidge offered to nominate him a third 
time, Warren declined.   
Part of the legacy of Coolidge can be found in the enormous success of people 
who had worked closely with him.  Some of those successful individuals include the 
following: Hughes and Stone, both of whom would become Chief Justice; Owen 
Roberts, whom Hoover would nominate to the Court; Vice-President Charles Dawes, 
who would receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his drafting of the Dawes Plan of 1924 
that temporarily solved an international crisis by reducing German reparations 
payments and stabilizing Germany’s shaky economy; Hoover, who would become 
President; Frank Kellogg, his Secretary of State, who won a Nobel Peace Prize for 
drafting the Kellogg-Briand Act of 1928 that purported to outlaw war “as an 
instrument of national policy”;202 and Hubert Work, Coolidge’s Presidential 
Secretary and Interior Secretary, who would become President of the National 
Republican Party. 
XX.  HERBERT HOOVER 
Herbert Hoover might be remembered primarily as the President on whose watch 
the Great Depression occurred and who lost to Franklin D. Roosevelt in the first of 
his four successful runs for the Presidency.  Yet, Hoover had a reputation as a 
reformer at the time he first ran for the Presidency in 1928.203  He had received 
international acclaim for his efforts to relieve famine abroad.   
Hoover’s approach to judicial appointments provoked some praise and a lot of 
criticism from members of his own party.  When he first became President, he 
pledged to not allow senators to dominate the selection process for partisan or 
personal gain.  Republican senators were displeased with the slight, and many of his 
lower court nominations and nearly all his Supreme Court appointments met 
resistance in the Senate.  In nominating progressives Charles Evans Hughes as Chief 
Justice and Benjamin Cardozo as an Associate Justice, Hoover further displeased 
conservatives within his party.  (Indeed, as Taft’s health failed and he foresaw the 
likelihood that Hoover would appoint his successor, he grew increasingly 
despondent.)  Hoover also nominated John Parker of the Fourth Circuit to the Court. 
This became the first Supreme Court nomination rejected in the 20th century after 
civil rights and labor groups mounted successful campaigns against the nomination.  
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His subsequent nomination of Owen Roberts was far less controversial but did little 
or nothing to heal the rifts within the party. 
Hoover’s difficulties with his own party included his ill-fated efforts to thwart the 
National depression.  His increase in loans through Federal Reserve banks and 
efforts to stimulate economic expansion with increased federal spending—some $19 
million on internal improvements—were bold steps when compared to earlier 
Presidential responses to economic downturns.  Moreover, the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation (hereinafter RFC), which he pushed through Congress in 1932, 
was a significant attempt to stimulate business by infusing $2 billion into the 
economy.204 The RFC funded loans to banks, railroads, agricultural credit 
corporations, and land banks. 
Hoover compounded problems by continually promising economic reversals that 
never came205 and, especially, by ordering federal troops under General Douglas 
MacArthur to remove World War I veterans from Washington’s Anacostia Flats 
(where they had gathered to ask for early payments of bonuses due to them).206  
Hoover lost further public support with his tough response to the 1932 Bonus 
March.207  If this were not enough, he offered no meaningful initiatives to deal with 
outbreaks of military hostilities abroad.   
Hoover’s lasting mark on the Presidency may be what he did after he was 
trounced by Roosevelt in the 1932 Presidential election.  After the defeat, Hoover 
began a 31-year post-Presidential career.208  He preached both conservation and 
philanthropy.  In the late 1940’s, he served at President Truman’s request on a fact-
finding international relief trip and then as Chairman of the Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.  Many of his 
recommendations on saving money were adopted.  He chaired a similar commission 
under President Eisenhower.  One example of his improved status was the renaming 
of the Boulder Dam, which was begun during his administration, as the Hoover Dam 
in 1947.   
XXI. CONCLUSION 
There is, of course, a good deal more that could be said about each of the 
Presidents I have discussed and their respective impact on constitutional practices.  
My hope is that, at the very least, I have been able to illustrate how some Presidents 
made a constitutional difference, even Presidents whom we dismiss as failures or 
worse.  The forgotten Presidents made decisions that have shaped constitutional 
practices pertaining to Presidential succession, executive privilege, the Supreme 
Court’s direction and composition, the regulation of federal territories, the conditions 
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for statehood, the scope of the House’s impeachment authority, censure, the size and 
responsibility of the national government, and the balance of power between the 
President and the Congress on appointments, treaties, and other international 
agreements.  The Constitution does not merely depend on the Court, the “great” 
Presidents, or the Supreme Court for its construction and implementation; it depends, 
at the very least, on the contributions of all of our leaders, including the forgotten 
Presidents. 
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